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ABSTRACT
Water Supply Aspects of River Authorities in Texas. (August 2006)
Sushma Krishnamurthi, B.A., Ethiraj College for Women, India;
M.A., Loyola College, India
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Ronald C. Griffin
Price has been noted to be an important ingredient in any evaluation of future 
water demands, since it is a signal of cost administered by water wholesalers or retailers. 
The purpose of this study is to contribute to a better understanding of rates and rate-
setting strategies adopted by the river authorities of Texas, and the relevance of 
economic efficiency for wholesale purveyors of water. Methods employed to accomplish 
the objectives include collecting sample water supply contracts, surveying rate 
structures, and surveying authorities' rate-setting objectives.
In its current form the economic theory of pricing emphasizes price 
establishment by retail water suppliers. There are certain distinctions between wholesale 
suppliers and retail distributors of water that question the adequacy of the existing theory 
in its universal application. This calls for a different theory of pricing for wholesale 
suppliers of water. Therefore, an efficiency-seeking pricing theory for wholesale water 
purveyors is explored here.
Out of the fifteen existing river authorities in Texas, ten have wholesale supply 
operations. This study finds that out of the ten authorities that have wholesale operations,
some authorities charge the same uniform rate to all their customers, while some charge 
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a different rate to each of their customers. The fact that some river authorities charge 
different rates to different categories of customers for the same water is considered 
economically inefficient.  Another element that lends itself to economic inefficiency is 
the usage of the block rates. 
Through a questionnaire, the study finds that river authorities rank revenue 
sufficiency highest among six objectives pertaining to rate-setting processes. Legality is 
ranked second and economic efficiency is ranked third among these six goals. Though 
there are ten river authorities that supply water on a wholesale basis, only eight valid 
questionnaires responses could be used for the study.
All river authorities involved with the wholesale supply of water commit most of 
their water supplies to municipal, agricultural, and industrial uses and customers through 
water supply contracts that contain legal agreements, which are dealt with before the 
river authority supplies the water to the customer. This study discusses the various 
similarities and differences between contracts of the ten river authorities that are 
involved in wholesale supply of water. Out of the ten river authorities, nine responded 
with their wholesale water supply contracts. One river authority responded with two 
contracts, therefore there were ten contracts that were studied.
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ANRA Angelina and Neches River Authority
BRA Brazos River Authority
GBRA Guadalupe-Blanco River Authority
LCRA Lower Colorado River Authority
LNRA Lavaca-Navidad River Authority
LNVA Lower Neches Valley Authority
NRA Nueces River Authority
RRA Red River Authority of Texas
SRA Sabine River Authority of Texas
SARA San Antonio River Authority
SJRA San Jacinto River Authority
SRBA Sulphur River Basin Authority
TRA Trinity River Authority of Texas
UCRA Upper Colorado River Authority
UGRA Upper Guadalupe River Authority
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Texas river authorities are a type of large, regional water district that are 
nonprofit. These river authorities are recognized as government entities of the State of 
Texas but do not receive any direct funds from the State. The authorities have power and 
influence in the arena of water management. In fact they control about 25 percent of 
surface water deliveries in Texas (Harper and Griffin, 1988) and this amount has 
increased over the years.  There are fifteen river authorities in Texas; ten deal with 
wholesale supply of surface water, one deals with retail supply of water, and four do not 
function as water suppliers. However, it must be remembered that they are like 
snowflakes (Leshy, 1983) as they are unlike each other in ways that they operate.  These 
organizations are heterogenous.
The state usually requires that authorities supply water for beneficial uses, such 
as municipal drinking water, agricultural irrigation, and industrial operations. The water 
supply contracts of river authorities are the means by which they commit their water 
supplies to various uses and customers. The contracts establish the legal terms of water 
use to protect the public’s interests. They are a long term commitment by river 
authorities to supply water to their customers.
This thesis follows the style of the Journal of the American Water Resources Association.
2Rate structures are important from an economic point of view. Water scarcity
issues all over the world have placed more stress on supply enhancement and demand 
management techniques of augmenting water.  Demand management techniques involve, 
among other methods, the raising of water rates to motivate people into using water with 
more thought towards conservation. The theory of economic pricing of water discusses 
economic efficiency in the pricing of water (Kahn, 1970). It is generally believed that 
river authorities do not consider economic efficiency to be an important objective when 
setting rates. Economic theory advocates marginal-cost pricing which has not been 
adopted by most water supply organizations. Part of this reluctance may be that marginal 
costs are harder to observe than are average costs. 
PROBLEM STATEMENT
The State of Texas could be divided geographically into the east, which is 
endowed with abundant water resources and the west which is arid. Potential for water 
shortages in high growth areas have water providers looking for means to augment water 
supply. Even political leaders and water resource managers understand the importance of 
water demand. Price has been noted as an important ingredient in any evaluation of 
future water demands, since it is a signal of cost administered by water suppliers. 
Economic efficiency is not given much consideration when setting water rates. 
According to pricing theory, maximum efficiency is obtained when price is equated to 
marginal cost (Kahn, 1970; Brown and Sibley, 1986). River authorities use the average-
cost pricing model rather than the marginal-cost one. It follows that economic efficiency 
3may not be achieved by river authorities in their rate setting. Price is an important factor 
that consumers will use in their decisions on the quantity of water they will consume. 
OBJECTIVES
Given this problem setting, four objectives are selected to direct the research 
conducted here.
1) Study water contracts in use by Texas river authorities by identifying important 
contract characteristics.
2) Determine the various factors affecting key characteristics of the water contracts 
used by river authorities in Texas.
3) Gauge whether economic efficiency is being advanced by contemporary water 
contracts through proper signaling of the appropriate marginal values.
4) Assess and compare the rate-setting objectives of Texas river authorities.
PROCEDURES
Methods to be employed to accomplish the objectives employ information from 
all river authorities about their water supply contracts and rate structures. The primary 
activities of this research are to pursue the following tasks.
1) Obtain sample water supply contracts of the river authorities that are involved in 
the wholesale supply of water. Examine these contracts and compile their 
similarities and differences.
2) Survey the rate structures of river authorities. Process and investigate the 
variations in rates information and tabulate the findings.
43) Survey the management of river authorities with regards to their rate-setting 
objectives. Questionnaires will be sent to the river authorities, which will be used 
to collect information on the rate-setting objectives of the river authorities.  
Ranking of the rate-setting objectives will be obtained to determine the relative 
importance of economic efficiency in their rate setting.
4) Explore an efficiency-seeking pricing theory for wholesale water purveyors.
5) Determine whether river authorities have any statutes or policies affecting the 
setting of rates. Assess whether they are following these statutes and working by 
established principles. Study rates or whether policy goals need to be changed to 
achieve economic efficiency.
FORMAT OF THE THESIS
Chapter II considers the existing economic theory of pricing which is applied to 
retail suppliers of water, providing a review of literature, thus far on pricing.  It then 
proceeds to build a theory of economic pricing for the wholesale purveyors of water. 
Chapter III provides a description of the data collected from the river authorities 
regarding contracts and rates. It also tabulates findings which lends itself to easy 
comparison between river authorities. Chapter IV includes the analysis of the rate 
schedules, contracts, and rate-setting objectives of river authorities. Chapter V presents 
the summary and conclusions of this thesis. It discusses the results, conclusions, 
implications, and limitations of this study and suggestions for further research.
5CHAPTER II
ECONOMIC THEORY OF PRICING
INTRODUCTION
All techniques to combat water scarcity are instances of supply enhancement or 
demand management. The former refers to more traditional measures undertaken to 
increase the supply of water such as building and enlarging dams and other such capital-
intensive alternatives. The latter attempts to control or manage demand by rationing 
water or raising water rates or educating water users about water conservation. 
The price of any commodity is a determinant of its demand; this is also the case 
with water. It may not be the only determinant of demand, but it may be one of the few 
that can be controlled. This makes the pricing of water an important demand 
management tool. The economic theory of pricing that has evolved has been of great 
use, despite being forsaken for revenue sufficiency more often than not by retailers and 
wholesalers in rate setting. The theory in practice, however, caters to only a section of 
the water suppliers, namely the retailers. There are certain distinctions between 
wholesale suppliers and retail distributors of water.  The differences between 
wholesalers and retailers question the adequacy of the existing theory in its universal 
application. This calls for a different theory of pricing for wholesale suppliers of water.
This chapter deals with the existing economic theory of pricing that applies to the 
retailers. It then moves on to enumerate the differences between wholesalers and 
6retailers. These differences throw some light on the reasons for the need for a new theory 
for wholesalers.
BASE (RETAIL) WATER PRICING THEORY
Wholesale suppliers of water are different in notable ways from retail distributors 
of water. "Wholesaling, in an economic sense, includes all activities relating to the 
purchase and sale of goods where the purpose of the customer is to resell the 
merchandise or to put the goods to business use" (Haring, 1940). "Retailing includes all 
the activities involved in selling goods or services directly to final consumers for 
personal, nonbusiness use. A retailer or retail store is any business enterprise whose sales 
volume comes primarily from retailing" (Kotler, 2003).
Wholesale suppliers of water don't sell or distribute water to or deal with the final 
consumer of water. There is a distribution network through which retailers supply final 
consumers with water. As a result of this direct contact with the final consumer, the 
water supplied by retailers is always highly processed. Processed water is water that has 
gone through various stages of filtration, pressurization, and various other forms of 
processing to be considered fit to use by the final consumer.
These differences begin to explain the need for a theory that also accommodates 
the wholesale sector of the water supply arena. Further, looking at the base economic 
pricing theory that retailers use and using the differences helps in building a new theory 
for wholesalers.
7Cost Determinants
According to the conventional theory, costs of supplying water are functionally 
dependent on the amount of water distributed. The theory has been found to be lacking 
or incomplete because the costs of supplying water do not rely only on the amount of 
water distributed. There are fixed costs which are correlated, albeit loosely, with the 
amount of water distributed. There are also other costs involved in the supply of water 
that are not related directly to the amount of water delivered, such as conveyance losses 
or leakage. Another cost function (2) has been introduced to replace the earlier cost 
function which was dependent only on the water distributed as has been shown in (1). 
      C(W)  (1)
C( N, W, N)                          (2)
This is explained in equation (1) and (2) where C represents costs, W represents the 
water delivered overall, N represents the number of connections, and ΔN stands for the 
number of new connections in the system (Griffin, 2006)
Pricing Water
There are three pricing components to this version of the pricing theory; they are 
the pricing of new connections, the pricing of water, and the pricing of existing 
connections. The pricing of water i.e., the volumetric component is explained first, 
followed by the pricing of connections, new and existing.
If the source of water is renewable, price would be set so that net benefits are 
maximized which in turn gives rise to the social value of natural water or the marginal 
value of water. "Maximizing systemwide net benefits subject to a current limit in the 
8availability of renewable water while using the cost function referred to in equation (2), 
and realizing that agents adjust their use so that their marginal benefits equal price, the 
following pricing advice for water is obtained" (Griffin, 2006). 
P MC MVW  (3)
Equation (3) shows the price when the source of water is renewable, where P is the price 
of water, MC is the marginal cost of producing that water, and MVW is the marginal 
value of unprocessed, renewable water.
When considering a depletable source of water, economic efficiency also
involves the setting of the price of water so that maximization of the net present value 
takes place. This gives rise to the marginal user cost, which is the future value of 
depletable water discounted to the current period. When resources are scarce, greater 
current use diminishes future opportunities. The marginal user cost is the present value 
of these foregone opportunities at the margin if the resource is used efficiently. The 
marginal user cost will grow over time at the rate of discount. This is an important 
implication of economic efficiency. As when the marginal user cost is incorporated into 
the price, the consumption will reduce by the economically efficient amount.  
P MC MUC   (4)
This is noted in equation (4) where P is the price of water, MC is the marginal cost of 
producing that water, and MUC is the marginal user cost.
There may be periods when the infrastructure for water supply is not enough to 
fulfill the quantity that is demanded. The inadequacy would be magnified for those water 
9suppliers growing due to the high capital costs of expansion. All capital investments 
should be timed in such as way as to achieve dynamic economic efficiency.
"Water supply systems grow in spurts to take advantage of scale economies at 
the time of construction"(Griffin, 2006). When a project as large as water projects can be 
is undertaken, it does not cost more to "enlarge things a bit".  Given this enlargement, 
some excess capacity will be created. This will last until demand catches up with this 
excess capacity and there comes the time for a new expansion. The timing of these 
periodic expansions affects the net benefits that the clients receive from their supply 
system as these expansions are capital-intensive (Griffin, 2006).
Initially there will be excess capacity given the investment, until an increase in 
demand extinguishes this excess and there is need for a new expansion.  Through the 
stage where the supply is exceeded by demand, rationing of water is necessary and it 
would be prudent to increase the price of water by the marginal capacity cost (Warford, 
2003) which ensures the equality of demand and supply as well as the channeling of 
water to its highest valued uses. 
                                   P MC MCC                                (5)
Equation (5) shows the price when marginal capacity cost is taken into account (MCC). 
"A pricing system that makes use of the MCC is consistent with optimal project timing, 
as the optimal scheduling over time depends on the optimal allocation within each 
period. Any failure on one side of this arrangement will perturb optimal action on the 
other side. This cost moves with time, either upward or downward, but this is not the 
case with the marginal value of water or marginal user cost that move upward with time. 
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The MCC rises when there is a scarcity and demand is high, but falls again with each 
supply expansion" (Griffin, 2006).
Therefore, the economic theory of pricing yields the retailers the following 
information:
                                  P MC MVW MCC               (6)
This is the case when the source of water is renewable in nature. And if the source of 
water is depletable in nature, then the following is true.
                                                  P MC MUC MCC                                       (7)
When there is no scarcity in natural water, the MVW and MUC are both zero. If there is 
excess capacity, then the MCC is zero. If demand is greater than supply, putting the 
MVW or MUC in the price decreases the quantity of water demanded, thereby lowering 
MCC, perhaps to zero (Griffin, 2006).
Besides just the volumetric price that has been accounted for so far, there are two 
other important components to the water rate. The first is the connections charge that is 
an initial, one-time payment made by the new consumer who will utilize the connection, 
which connects it to the water distribution network. 
The second component is the meter charge, which is a recurring payment made 
by all water users. It is measured by taking the difference between the estimated 
revenues and the estimated costs and dividing the difference by the number of 
connections. This component could be used by water supply systems to balance their 
budgets. The difference could be made up using the meter charge (Griffin, 2006).  
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Economic Efficiency 
An important benchmark by which pricing policies may be judged is the 
contribution those policies make toward economic efficiency. An efficient policy is 
defined as one that maximizes the net benefits or net present value accruing to the 
community from a given course of action. Net benefits are the difference between 
benefits and costs. Net present value is the sum, over the chosen planning horizon, of all 
net benefits accruing to an action and discounted to current value terms. The proposition 
stemming from this definition is that the price of any service or commodity should be 
equated to the cost of producing an additional unit of it, or to its marginal cost. 
A related concept that is very important to an understanding of resource 
allocation is opportunity cost. With a given productive capacity, a decision to produce 
more of one good implies the decision to produce less of other items. The cost to society 
of producing anything is made up of other things that must be sacrificed to produce it, or 
the value of the alternatives foregone. Marginal cost is defined as the cost of producing 
one more unit of output, or conversely, the cost that is saved from producing one less 
unit. In the context of water supply, marginal cost has been defined as the cost of savings 
incurred in providing more or less water service (Mann and Schlenger, 1982). 
A basic challenge for an economy is to use these resources to maximum 
advantage. At any given time the basic economic problem is to make the best or most 
efficient use of limited capacity (Kahn, 1988, pp. 66). For this to happen requires that the 
benefit gained from consuming one more unit of a good equals the cost to produce it. 
That is, the marginal benefits equal the marginal costs as is shown in equation (8).
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Benefits can be derived from the demand curve for the good or service provided by the 
action. Demand curves measure the amount of a particular good people would be willing 
to purchase at various prices. For each quantity purchased, the corresponding point on 
the demand curve represents the amount of money a person is willing to pay for the last 
unit of the good, which is the marginal benefit derived from that unit (Tietenberg, 1999).
MB MC (8)
This outcome of MB MC can be ensured by setting the price of the commodity equal 
to its marginal cost. 
P MC (9)
Prices provide signals that guide people’s behavior. If they are to make choices that reap 
the greatest possible benefit from society’s limited resources, the prices that they pay 
must accurately reflect the opportunity costs associated with the commodities they are 
considering. If their judgments are correctly informed in this way, they will guide scarce 
resources into those lines of production that maximizes the net benefits or net present 
value to society as a whole (Kahn, 1988; Hanemann, 1998, pp.149-151).
Could not prices equal average rather than marginal costs? If price had no 
influence at all on demand, it would not necessarily matter. But, in fact, the demand for 
all commodities is in some degree, at some point, responsive to price. Then, if 
consumers are to decide whether to take somewhat more or somewhat less of any item, 
the price they pay should reflect the cost of supplying somewhat more or somewhat less 
of the item – the marginal cost. Suppose buyers were charged a price higher than the 
marginal cost ( P MC ), they would buy less than the socially optimum quantity. 
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Welfare could be improved if they consumed more of this good and less of other goods 
as a whole. Some consumers, who would have consumed more of this good and less of 
others, will refrain from doing so because the price exaggerates the item’s opportunity 
cost. Conversely, if P MC , they will buy more of the commodity than is socially 
optimal.  Producers are diverting more resources to the production of the commodity 
than customers would have willingly authorized, had the price fully reflected the 
marginal opportunity cost (Kahn, 1988, pp. 66-67; Hanemann, 1998, pp.149-151).
Most retailers when setting rates at which they sell water normally use the 
average cost as this affords them their much wanted revenue sufficiency. When the rate 
structure and the levels of the rates are adequate in recovering the total costs associated 
with the provision of that service, revenue sufficiency is said to be had. Since pricing 
affects future decisions, economists prefer to use costs that are forward-looking and 
marginal in nature in the setting of rates, rather than what the retailers use. As has been 
mentioned above, the equating of price and marginal cost leads to the achievement of 
economic efficiency, but if price were equal to the average cost and not to the marginal 
cost, economic efficiency may not be achieved. Therefore, it may not be economically 
efficient to divide the total costs by the water quantity (average-cost pricing) to arrive at 
the revenue sufficiency pricing by retailers. Average-cost pricing may be economically 
acceptable when it is equivalent to marginal cost. 
As seen in Figure 2.1 price 'RP that is charged by retailers falls short of achieving 
economic efficiency because it is lower than the economically efficient price *RP . Price 
ought to be set at the point where the marginal cost curve intersects with the marginal 
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benefit curve at the price *RP  and the water quantity at
*
RW . This is the point where 
economic efficiency is achieved. However, the price is set at 'RP  where the average cost 
equals the marginal benefits. This is done because it is at the average cost that retailers 
break even. This may be the normal case for retailers, where the price set is lower than 
the economically efficient price. As price is the signal for consumers, an increase in the 
rates would result in a reduction in consumption.
Economic Efficiency and Cost Recovery
Two-part water tariffs enable retail suppliers of water to achieve both economic 
efficiency and cost recovery objectives. Cost recovery is synonymous with revenue 
sufficiency. The essence of the two-part charging is that the consumer is called on to pay 
two charges, one which varies directly with the amount of the commodity that he 
consumes and another which does not (Lewis, 1941). An incentive to the use of a two-
part tariff is the existence of standing charges which continue whether a firm is operating 
or not. First, where in consequence of periodical fluctuations in demand, there are 
regular periods when equipment is standing idle, it is often suggested that the only 
scientific way to allocate costs to consumers is to use a two-part tariff. And secondly, 
even where there are no such regular fluctuations, a retailer may find it profitable to use 
a two-part tariff in order to escape the risks of unforeseen change. By using a nonwater 
15
Figure 2.1.  Marginal-Cost Pricing for Retailers.
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charge to cover the difference between the average cost and the marginal cost, retailers 
can use two-part tariffs to price water.
Most industries are subject to some degree of regular fluctuation in the demand 
for their products, the water industry is no exception to this case. There is more demand 
for water during the dry, hot months. Where the product can be easily stored, these 
fluctuations in demand need not induce similar fluctuations in production. If the product 
can not be stored, or the cost of storing it is prohibitive, the result is different; the plant 
must be large enough to meet the maximum demand and when demand slackens, 
equipment lies idle. It is then necessary, in computing marginal cost, to distinguish 
between supplies produced at the peak and at other times.
The two-part tariff might also be used as protection against risks of unforeseen 
change such as unforeseeable changes in climate. From the retailers point of view the 
most satisfactory arrangement might be to avoid all risk by getting each potential 
consumer to pay in advance some portion of the investment costs. If in the aggregate 
consumers contributed sums sufficient to cover the capital invested, the retailer would be 
relieved of all risk of loss. This arrangement could be used by the retailer wherein the 
consumer pays in advance for services that he may never use, like the "take-or-pay"
option.
RETAIL VERSUS WHOLESALE
As has been mentioned early on in this chapter, there are some basic differences 
between retailers and wholesalers in every field. The collective differences between 
retail 
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suppliers and wholesale purveyors of water are assembled in Table 2.1. These
differences are empirical or observed differences and not theoretical differences. Item 1 
in Table 2.1 indicates that wholesalers almost always handle natural water. The water 
may be processed to some extent as water is captured and stored in a reservoir, but the 
nature of wholesale treatment is various degrees lower than that of retailers. 
The second difference listed in Table 2.1 specifies that wholesalers focus almost 
exclusively on surface water while retailers may deal with surface and/or ground water. 
This could be because wholesalers have a comparative advantage when dealing with 
surface water and a comparative disadvantage when dealing with ground water. Retailers 
have a comparative disadvantage with procuring surface water as this type of water is 
normally found in large quantities in its natural state (rapidly flowing). It is also very 
expensive to attempt to store this surface water after having captured it. 
Wholesalers emphasize bulk transmissions and site storage such as reservoirs, 
whereas retailers emphasize transportation, treatment, tank storage (ground and above 
ground) and distribution. There is more value-added per-unit to the water with retailing 
than with wholesaling. As there is more emphasis placed on transportation, treatment, 
tank storage, and distribution in the case of the retail suppliers, they have higher 
accounting costs when compared to the wholesale purveyors of water. 
Wholesale suppliers of water are more likely to be publicly owned and nonprofit 
by default. This allows for a greater influence of politics in water rate setting. If the 
supplier started out as a public entity, there is a tendency to stay public. This may be the 
case because of inertia. Water providers, whether wholesale or retail were not publicly 
18
TABLE 2.1. Differences between Retail Suppliers and Wholesale Purveyors of Water.
Retailers Wholesalers
1. Sell and distribute water to final 
consumers
Do not sell or distribute water to final 
consumers
2. Handle processed water Almost always handle natural water
3. Buy or capture surface and ground 
water
Focus almost exclusively on surface 
water
4. Emphasis on: transportation, 
treatment, tanks, lakes and distribution
 More accounting costs per unit 
of water.
 More value added per unit
Emphasis on: bulk transmission, site 
storage
 Less accounting costs per unit 
of water
 Less value added per unit
5. Are publicly or privately owned More likely to be publicly owned and 
non-profit in nature
6. Large number of customers Fewer customers
7. Charge customers a water bill
 No contract instruments 
available for customers
 Can ask customers to pay 
upfront costs of transmission
Contract with customers
 Variety of contract terms 
available.
 Build costs into contracts
8. Customers do not have take-or-pay 
option
Customers may have the take-or-pay 
option
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owned to a large extent in the U.S. until the 1900’s. This move to public ownership came 
about due to the income tax exemptions for municipal bonds that were introduced after 
World War I. Public water suppliers are not required to pay the market rate of interest 
when borrowing construction funds. As the costs of construction of water supply 
projects are extremely high more suppliers of water turned public. Also "implications 
include lower costs for publicly owned infrastructure – recalling that the water industry 
is extremely capital-intensive – and therefore lower rates for water consumers, unless 
private operators can counter this advantage with other savings" (Griffin, 2006).
Wholesalers are involved in both market and nonmarket activities. These nonmarket 
activities include the management of water for recreation, environmental habitat, etc. 
Wholesalers harness water from rivers and create dams and reservoirs for the purpose of 
supplying water. These large amounts of water are costly to store and are made into 
lakes, which are then used for the aforementioned nonmarket purposes. 
As the number of customers is much larger with a retail supplier of water, there 
is also a large inventory of meters to check on the retail customers' consumption. Item 6 
in Table 2.1 indicates the difference in the case of wholesalers. The overall numbers of 
customers are low while the amount supplied to each customer is high. The number of 
meters would also be low. There is also no meter charge involved in the wholesale 
supply of water. The wholesale customers essentially agree, in their contracts, to bear the 
costs of installation, operation, and maintenance of meters for the accurate measurement 
of all water diverted by them. The wholesale customer is supposed to allow the 
wholesaler access to the meters for the purpose of making meter readings and/or periodic 
20
inspections. Wholesaler's customers are fewer in number compared to a retailer's 
customers, so they have more power. They may be able to influence prices to a larger 
extent, that is, each customer affects the revenue of a wholesale purveyor of water. If 
one of their customers cuts back then there could be a sizable fall in the revenue. The 
customers of wholesale purveyors of water may have some more control over the setting 
of prices than the retailers.
Wholesalers tend to have contracts with customers that outline the price and the 
quantity supplied. Retailers supply water to the final consumer and bill them based on 
their usage. There are a variety of contract terms that the wholesalers use that retailers do 
not, due to the absence of contracts. Also retailers more commonly ask consumers to pay 
upfront some costs of infrastructure through connection fees while wholesalers build 
these costs into the contract. 
Item 8 in Table 2.1 indicates that retailers do not use "take-or-pay" provisions in 
their dealings with their customers. This is a provision, written into a contract, whereby 
the consumer has the obligation of either taking delivery of a minimum quantity of water 
at a specified price or paying the minimum specified amount. If the customer does not 
use the water, then the same price would be paid. Wholesale customers use take-or-pay 
provisions. They pay for water that they may or may not use as a safety measure. 
Retailers do not pay for water that they may or may not use. In case of a drought, the 
wholesale consumer still has the ability to use the water that may not have been used had 
there not been a drought, yet was paid for. In case of excess supply of water, the 
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wholesaler is protected by this option when the consumer pays for the water that is not 
used.
WHOLESALE WATER PRICING THEORY
In retail systems, the management determines the price structure since there is no 
free market. In the case of water received from wholesale distributors, the market may 
be highly restricted because the water suppliers are publicly owned and contract with 
specific water retailers that also tend to be public authorities. Wholesalers tend to price 
the water to cover historical construction costs and current operation, maintenance and 
repair costs (Howe, 1993).
Depicting economic efficiency with wholesalers is different than with retailers 
due in part to the position and shape of the average cost curve. The price is said to be 
economically efficient when it promotes patterns and levels of water use that motivate 
only the most valued uses of the wholesaler's limited water supplies. In the case of 
wholesale suppliers of water, average costs of supplying the water are normally, but not 
necessarily larger than the marginal costs of supplying the same water. With retailers it 
is noted in Figure 2.1 that the average cost may be lower than the marginal cost.
However, this is not necessarily a general condition. It would be convenient to price 
water at the level where the average cost equals the marginal cost. This might not even 
be possible as the marginal cost curve, MCH, as shown in Figure 2.2, might be almost 
flat and not move upward within a relevant range of demand to meet the average cost 
curve, ACH, at its minimum point as it does in the case of retailers. The price that is 
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economically efficient, *HP , is lower than the price that is arrived at with average cost 
pricing 'HP . It would be economically efficient to set the water price where the marginal 
costs are considered. The marginal costs could equal the average cost and this would be 
the perfect deal, where both economic efficiency and revenue sufficiency is achieved.  
That is, economists would be content that pricing would be efficient and the wholesalers 
would also be satisfied as they would be breaking even. Such circumstances are unlikely.
Fixing efficiency in the wholesale sector alone does not mean that all is well, as an 
inefficiency in the retail sector will affect the efficiency, or its achievement in the 
wholesale sector. "If a distortion exists in one sector – that is, there is some constraint 
that prevents the first-best optimal conditions from being satisfied in this sector, it is no 
longer generally desirable to apply the first-best optimality condition in the other 
sectors"  (Laffont,1990). When we have certain constraints that prevent the achievement 
of a first-best optimum then we are forced to look to a definition of a second-best 
optimum that takes into account the available political economic instruments 
(Laffont,1990). 
When the marginal costs are lower than the average cost, as is the case is Figure 
2.2, a two-part water tariff may be used. Two-part water tariffs have an important role to 
play in enabling wholesale suppliers of water to achieve both economic efficiency and 
cost recovery objectives. Economic efficiency requires that wholesale water be priced at 
marginal cost, which leads to a low water price. If this be the case, then a single-part 
tariff may not be able to recover the full costs of water supply. If a two-part tariff is 
used, then the necessary revenues can be raised with a fixed charge without distorting 
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Figure 2.2.  Marginal-Cost Pricing for Wholesalers.
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the price signal contained in the volumetric charge. These fixed charges could be 
transfer payments or dues that are not related to the quantity of water consumed.
There are alternative assumptions which can be made in the development of a 
wholesale pricing theory:
1. Using marginal-cost pricing in both sectors with specific reference to the 
objective of economic efficiency.
2. Using average-cost pricing in both sectors with specific reference to the objective 
of revenue sufficiency.
The implementation of the above stated modifications raise differing policy issues. 
These assumptions and their consequences are discussed in the following subsections.
Marginal-cost pricing in both sectors
Economists aim at achieving economic efficiency which could be arrived at with 
the help of marginal-cost pricing. Marginal-cost pricing and economic efficiency go 
hand in hand. Given that the retail supplier demands water from the wholesaler, their 
marginal benefits and marginal costs would be intertwined. Taking the case of 
marginal-cost pricing in a scenario where there is just one retailer iR , this retailer has 
marginal benefits ( RiMB ) and marginal costs ( RiMC ).Explanations of labels in figures 
are given in Table 2.2. This is explained with the help of a diagram, Figure 2.3. The 
marginal net benefits of the retailer iR  may be measured by the difference between the 
marginal benefits and the marginal costs. Equation (10) represents the relationship.
R R Ri i i
MNB MB MC  (10)
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Table 2.2. Explanations of Labels on Figures 2.1-2.4.
'
RP Retail Price using Average-Cost Pricing.
*
RP Efficient Retail Price
'
RW Retail Water Quantity using Average-Cost Pricing
*
RW Efficient Retail Water Quantity
Ri
MC Marginal Costs of Retailer
Ri
MB Marginal Benefits of Retailer
Ri
AC Average Costs of Retailer
WR Retailer Water
Ri
MNB Marginal Net Benefits of Retailer = Marginal Benefits – Marginal Costs.
'
HP Wholesale Price using Average-Cost Pricing
*
HP Efficient Wholesale Price
'
HW Wholesale Water Quantity using Average-Cost Pricing
*
HW Efficient Wholesale Water Quantity
MCH Marginal Costs of Wholesaler
HMB Marginal Benefits of Wholesaler
HAC Average Costs of Wholesaler
WH Wholesale Water
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Ri
MNB of all the retailers put together makes up the marginal benefit (demand) function 
faced by the wholesaler. In this scenario we note that there is one wholesaler who has 
multiple clients or retailers. The marginal benefits that the wholesaler "sees" ( HMB ) is 
the sum total of the marginal net benefits of all the retailers iR , that is, RiMNB . This is 
noted within equation (11).
H Ri
MB MNB          (11)
As may be seen in the left panel of Figure 2.3, the efficient wholesale price is set 
where the marginal benefits equal the marginal costs of the wholesaler. That is, price is 
set equal to marginal cost. This leads to the efficient quantity of water ( *HW ) and the 
efficient price ( *HP ). To take into account the wholesale price (
*
HP ) in the retail sector,
marginal costs are shifted upwards by *HP  in the retail sector. As can be seen in Figure 
2.3., the *R HiMC P  curve cuts the RiMB curve resulting in the efficient price 
*
RP and the 
efficient quantity *RW . There is an extension of the 
*
HP from the wholesaler's graph to the 
retailer's graph where it hits the RiMNB curve. This indicates a difference between the 
wholesale and retail prices.
As marginal-cost pricing is undertaken a policy issue comes into focus. A 
problem of revenue sufficiency arises in the case of the wholesaler when marginal-cost 
pricing is utilized. The rate structure and the levels of rates ought to more than 
adequately recover the total costs associated with providing the service if the wholesaler 
should break even. As has been mentioned earlier, most wholesalers are publicly owned
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Figure 2.3.  Marginal-Cost Pricing in Wholesale and Retail Sectors.
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and nonprofit in nature, and one of their important objectives is to break even or cover 
costs. There may be a revenue shortfall in both wholesale and retail sectors with the 
usage of marginal-cost pricing, but the issue of shortfall or surplus in the retail sector 
will be set aside as the main focus of this chapter is wholesale pricing theory. The price 
set while taking the average cost into account at the efficient quantity of water supplied 
is named AC* as it is not the point where the average cost curve meets the marginal 
benefits curve. The revenue shortfall may be significant, and in Figure 2.3 it is the 
shaded area.
                         Revenue Shortfall * * *H HW .(AC P )                                              (12)
Solutions for this issue are discussed in a forthcoming section. 
Average-cost pricing in both sectors
Figure 2.4, which is a reformulation of Figure 2.3, can guide the alternative 
situation in which both retail and wholesale sectors rely on average cost pricing. 
Following the basic layout of Figure 2.3, there is one retailer whose costs and benefits 
are depicted in the right panel of Figure 2.4. The difference between the marginal 
benefits and the marginal costs result in the marginal net benefits when marginal-cost 
pricing is used. In the average cost pricing case we have marginal benefits and average 
costs as the relevant behavior. The difference between the two leads to the curve marked 
R Ri i
MB AC in Figure 2.4. This curve and other similar curves of all the retailers that 
the wholesaler caters to form the marginal benefit curve of the wholesaler. This may be 
seen in the left panel of Figure 2.4.  That is, we note that:
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H R Ri i
MB MB AC )            (13)
Under average-cost pricing the price is set where the HMB and the HAC intersect 
at 'HP . The corresponding quantity of wholesale water is
'
HW . This price and quantity of 
water that are determined using average-cost pricing are not economically efficient. The 
price does afford the wholesaler revenue sufficiency, which allows the wholesaler to 
break even. This being one of the priorities of wholesalers, having achieved it they 
forget that it is not an efficient price.
To take into account the wholesale price in the retail sector the average costs are 
shifted upwards by 'HP  resulting in the new 
'
R Hi
AC P  curve, as seen in the right panel 
of Figure 2.4. This produces the retail price where the average cost curve intersects with 
the marginal benefits curve ( RiMB ). The corresponding quantity of retail water is 
'
RW . 
As was indicated in Figure 2.3, the wholesale price of 'HP is extended from the wholesale 
graph to the retail one.  The RiAC and the RiMB curves give rise to the         
R Ri i
MB AC curve which has been explained above. 
With the usage of average-cost pricing a policy issue arises. In the setting of 
Figure 2.4 water is underused due to the inefficiency in water use. 'HW is an inefficient 
level of water use. As may be seen in Figure 2.4, this level of water could be lower than 
the efficient water level *HW and the price higher than
*
HP . A regulatory policy,    
average-cost pricing is used for public entities (especially those that are natural 
monopolies) in which the price received by a wholesaler is set equal to the average total
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Figure 2.4. Average-Cost Pricing in Both Sectors.
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cost of production. The great thing about average-cost pricing is that a wholesaler breaks 
even. A bad thing about average-cost pricing is that marginal cost is less than average 
total cost meaning that price is greater than marginal cost. The wholesaler is then not 
operating according to the price equals marginal cost ( P MC ) rule of efficiency. The 
solution to this policy issue is also dealt with in the next subsection.
Solutions
The policy issues that crop up while using either marginal-cost or average-cost 
pricing may be solved using certain policy tools accordingly. The inefficiency that 
occurs with average-cost pricing could be solved by using marginal-cost pricing. 
Average-cost pricing, restricts consumption to a suboptimal level. As the basic issue is 
inefficiency, if marginal-cost pricing were to be adopted these problems could be 
resolved. 
On the other hand, marginal-cost pricing leads to a revenue shortfall. This 
problem that arises with marginal-cost pricing may be solved with the use of a lump sum 
instrument. This lump sum device should be something that is separate from the 
volumetric price of water, something that will not detract from economic efficiency 
while providing the wholesaler with revenue sufficiency. Two-part tariffs could be used 
to obtain efficiency when the average costs are higher than marginal costs. According to 
Ng and Weisser (1974) when average costs are above marginal costs as is the case with 
wholesale purveyors of water, then the use of marginal-cost pricing leads to revenue 
insufficiency, which cannot be covered with "nonlump sum taxes", as these "taxes"
might lead the prices away from their "first best marginal values". With the usage of a 
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two-part tariff, the balance could be recovered by requesting the consumer pay a "license 
fee" or a fixed charge which should not be dependent on the quantity of water consumed. 
Auerbach and Pellechio (1978) define the two-part tariff as that which "involves 
charging individuals a constant price per unit of purchase and a fixed charge or license 
fee for the availability of purchasing at the constant price".
This fixed charge would not vary with the amount of water consumed. As it does 
not change, it will not affect the demand by each consumer, and the consumption will 
remain at the optimum level where the price equals marginal cost. This fixed charge 
makes up a large part of the water rate that is faced by the consumer, in this case the 
retailer. Therefore, the allocation of the shortfall among consumers is an important issue. 
The easiest approach would be to divide the revenue shortfall by the number of 
consumers. This would result in a lower average price for large volume users although 
the marginal price would remain the same for all customers (McNeill and Tate, 1991). 
This kind of tariff is referred to as a uniform two-part tariff. Another alternative 
is to consider for each consumer a personalized fixed part, such that the total fixed parts 
of all the consumers who buy the commodity cover the total loss. This type of tariff is 
referred to as a personalized two-part tariff, or simply as a two-part tariff (Vohra, 1990).
These schemes have the following general structure:
T(q) = B + B(q) (14)
Where T(q) is the total payment schedule as a function of quantity, q, and B and B(q) are 
the fixed and variable portions of the payment schedule. The marginal cost of q to the 
purchaser under the two-part pricing formula is dT/dq = B'(q) (Masten, 1988).
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Another option in making up the revenue shortfall that arises when marginal-cost 
pricing is undertaken could be that the wholesaler could receive government money. 
This money could be given to the wholesaler by the state or the federal government. 
TAKE-OR-PAY CONTRACTS
Brooke (1992) defines a take-or-pay contract as one "that requires the buyer to 
either purchase a minimum volume of product at a set price ("take") or pay for the 
minimum without taking delivery ("pay"), while retaining a limited right to take delivery 
in the future". This shifts the risk away from the seller and onto the buyer in case there is 
any change in the demand. The seller then guarantees the buyer supply of the commodity 
in question. The buyer has to make the decision on how much of the commodity will be 
used. If the seller is unable to "meet the take obligation, the shortfall at the average price 
needs to be paid for over the contract period" (Brooke, 1992).  
The take-or-pay clause has been part of long term natural gas contracts since the 
1950’s as it benefited both producers (sellers) as well as the pipelines (buyers). It helped 
the producers gain a constant cash flow even when there was no profitable market for 
gas, and ensured that the pipeline would not be able to use the contract with the producer 
as an "uncompensated storage agreement" (Medina, 1989), as was the case before its 
inclusion.  The pipeline was ensured a continuous supply while also gaining some 
flexibility in the quantities of gas that it could draw. The risk was then placed on the 
buyer rather than the seller, and until the fall in natural gas prices took place in the 80’s 
this clause in their contracts seemed to work well for both parties. After the fall in prices, 
the market price for gas was lower than the price at which the pipelines were required to 
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buy the gas. They then tried to get out of the contracts through "negotiation and 
modification of contracts, settlements and litigation". These actions were largely unable 
to help the pipelines. Even though the contracts were not beneficial at that point in time,
the buyers and sellers still use them in their contracts as they are still "mutually 
beneficial to both parties" (Medina, 1989, 1991).
Take-or-pay clauses are included in long term contracts because of the 
"incentives" they produce in getting supplies when demand shifts or other changes take 
place. Even though critics of take-or-pay provisions claim that the clause is a barrier to 
the price system by making buyers purchase at higher rates when there are lower priced 
alternatives present, they are not taking into account that the clause also ensures 
"efficient responses to changing conditions" (Masten, 1988). 
So far the literature on take-or-pay contracts has pointed to these clauses being 
devices for sharing risk alone. This is not the only use to which these contracts can be 
put to. DeCanio (1990) explains the "full economic significance of take-or-pay 
contracts" by directing more attention to the interdependence of these contracts and other 
contracts that are entered into by both wholesalers and retailers. 
Take-or-pay provisions continue to be an important element in the contracts 
between purchasers of natural resources and their suppliers. In take-or-pay 
arrangements, purchasers are assured of a steady supply at a negotiated price, and 
suppliers are guaranteed steady revenue in a long-term contract with little or no risk 
from declining demand (Schultz, 1997).
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SUMMARY
With growing water scarcity and increasing competition across water-using 
sectors, the need for water savings and more efficient water use has increased in 
importance in water resources management. The economic theory of pricing suggests 
economic efficiency would be attained at the point where water is priced at the marginal 
cost. Enhancing economic efficiency is a broad concept seeking the highest economic 
value of water use through both physical and managerial measures. While this theory 
works for a certain slice of the suppliers of water, it does not work for some others, like 
the wholesalers. 
To undertake a wholesale pricing theory as opposed to a retail pricing theory it is 
imperative to know what the main differences are between the two. These differences 
are the reasons that call for a wholesale pricing theory. The retail pricing theory was first 
handled before dealing with the differences to show clearly the need of a wholesale 
pricing theory. 
The theory makes two assumptions, namely usage of marginal-cost pricing in 
both wholesale and retail sectors and average-cost pricing in both sectors. The 
assumptions and their solutions were then discussed in some detail. 
The solution to the assumption of average-cost pricing in both sectors is the 
usage of marginal-cost pricing to deal with the policy issue of lack of economic 
efficiency that arises with this form of pricing. Similarly, the two-part tariff was 
explained in an effort to deal with the revenue shortfall issue that arises with the 
marginal-cost pricing scenario. 
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Even if the wholesaler were to supply water to different customers at different 
rates, this theory would hold. This is so because the sum of all the marginal benefits 
accrued by all the retailers it supplies water to makes up the marginal benefit curve for 
the wholesaler.
Take-or-pay contracts form an important part of long term contracts. Since 
wholesale purveyors of water deal with long term contracts and also are known to use 
take-or-pay clauses in their contracts, this clause was also discussed.
We see that water prices, appropriately set and applied at different points of the 
water supply cycle, perform many valuable functions, namely to allocate existing 
supplies efficiently by confronting water users with the costs of providing water, to help 
signal water suppliers when supply augmentation is needed, and to help shape a rational 
approach to a healthy water environment.
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CHAPTER III
DATA DESCRIPTION
Three elements will be covered in this chapter. In accordance with the first 
objective of the thesis, the first element investigates water supply contracts of those 
Texas river authorities that are wholesale suppliers of water. Each river authority acts 
differently in its dealings with its customers and also has different types of customers. 
Therefore, the water supply contracts that these wholesale purveyors of water have with 
the customers will be examined.
The second objective of this thesis is to determine the various factors that may 
affect key characteristics of the water contracts used by river authorities in Texas. The 
price of a commodity affects the quantity demanded. The demand management angle of 
using current water supplies more effectively speaks of using water rates as a means to 
control the use of water (Griffin, 2006). Therefore looking into the rates set by the river 
authorities, who are the wholesale purveyors of water discussed in Chapter II, for its 
customers is logical. The second element that will be covered in this chapter is the water 
supply rate schedules of Texas river authorities. 
The last element to be covered in this chapter is the rate-setting objectives of 
Texas river authorities. The last objective set forth in Chapter I is to assess and compare 
the rate-setting objectives of Texas river authorities. This rate-setting element addresses 
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that objective. This chapter deals with only data description. Analysis and interpretation 
of data is dealt with in the next chapter.
WATER SUPPLY CONTRACTS
All river authorities involved with the supply of water commit most of their 
water supplies to various uses and customers through contracts. These wholesale 
suppliers of water have a contract with their customers that contain legal agreements that 
need to be dealt with before the river authority supplies the water to the customer. 
There are fifteen river authorities in Texas, all of which were surveyed for their 
information on their rates and contracts in early August 2004. Contact information was 
found on the official websites of each river authority. When the contact information of 
the person in charge of rates was not available, it was acquired from the person whose 
contact information was displayed on the website. An e-mail was sent to all the river 
authorities. Response with their contracts ranged from almost an immediate response to 
several months. The procedure followed was to send an e-mail reminder to those 
authorities that did not respond within the first three weeks after the initial e-mail was 
sent out. Another e-mail reminder was sent out following the lack of response with three 
authorities. Later, phone calls were made to those authorities that had still not replied 
with their information.
 Out of the fifteen, four river authorities claim to not be involved in water supply 
operations and one is not involved in wholesale water supply operations. The four are 
the Angelina Neches River Authority, the Nueces River Authority, the Sulphur River 
Basin Authority, and the Upper Guadalupe River Authority. The Red River Authority of 
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Texas is involved in the retail supply of water. The remaining ten river authorities are 
therefore wholesale suppliers of water. Contracts were obtained from all the authorities 
except for the Lavaca Navidad River Authority (LNRA). Despite several requests by e-
mail and finally by telephone, the authority did not provide their contract terms. 
Ten contracts were received from the nine authorities, TRA replied with two 
contracts. These contracts were examined and the terms in all contracts were tabulated. 
The number of pages would not be an indication to the length of each contract rather the 
number of words would be a better indicator of the length. For example, BRA has only 
13 pages but has 6,951 words while LCRA has 28 pages, it has 6,728 words. These are 
the wordiest contracts of the nine river authorities whose contracts were analyzed.  The 
shortest is the contract of GBRA, consisting of 3 pages and 1,254 words. LNVA’s 
contract is slightly wordier at 2,720 words and 6 pages. SARA and TRA’s representative 
city contract have about the same number of pages and words. SARA has 11 pages and 
4078 words while TRA has 9 pages and 4089 words. Word counts were not performed 
for the remaining contracts, because they were not received in an electronic format. 
Given that each of the contracts has various terms, related features were grouped 
together and tabulated. This led to the six separate tables labeled as Tables 3.1-3.6. Six 
groupings are as follows.
 Price and quantity terms
 Water terms
 Environmental terms
 Legal terms
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 Dispute and regulation terms
 Construction terms
Not surprisingly, some contract elements are unique to certain authorities.
Price and Quantity Terms
The contract term for the exceedance of contracted quantity in Table 3.1, found 
its way into the contracts of the Lower Colorado River Authority (LCRA), the Sabine 
River Authority of Texas (SRA), the Lake Livingston Project part of the Trinity River 
Authority (TRA) and the Upper Colorado River Authority (UCRA). This term ensures 
that if the customer's annual diversion is greater than the contracted quantity agreed upon 
in the contract, then the customer would have to settle on a new standard water supply 
contract for a larger quantity. 
Also, the authority would then be able to charge the customer an extra amount 
for the additional amount of water diverted by the customer in excess of the contracted 
quantity. In the case of the Brazos River Authority (BRA), if the customer were to divert 
more water than is stated in the contract, then the authority’s ability to provide to its 
other water customers would be affected. In case the customer requires an additional 
amount of water then he agrees to turn in a "written notice" ahead of time of need. This 
is also true of LCRA.
The next term of Table 3.1 pertains to "limitation in water quantity", present only 
in the contract of the Lower Neches Valley Authority (LNVA). The authority is required
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TABLE 3.1. Contract Price and Quantity Terms.
Terms BRA GBRA LCRA LNVA SRA SARA SJRA TRA UCRA
A B
Price and Payment of 
Water         
Contracted Quantity       
Exceedance of 
Contracted Quantity       
Limitation on Quantity 
Rate Revision  
A : Lake Livingston reservoir; B : A Representative City
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to only provide its customers with the water that it has available to it. Also according to 
the contract, the authority has no obligation to enlarge its water supply capacity so it 
may supply the customer with more than the contractual quantity. There is also a clause 
which is highlighted in the contract that claims that in case of "unforeseen and 
unexpected incidents" that curb the availability of an adequate amount of water, then the 
available water will be circulated and divided as stated by Section 11.039 of the Texas 
Water Code (reproduced in Appendix A of this thesis).
The last term in Table 3.1, rate revision, is present only in the contracts of the 
Guadalupe-Blanco River Authority (GBRA) and the San Jacinto River Authority 
(SJRA). This term explains that the authorities have the obligation, duty, and the power 
to revise water supply rates from time to time. These rate revisions may be introduced 
only after the authority has given the customer advance written notice of the increase in 
rates. 
Water Terms
The first item of Table 3.2, "point(s) of diversion", is present in the contracts of 
GBRA, LCRA, LNVA, SRA, the San Antonio River Authority (SARA), SJRA, and the 
representative city section of TRA1. This explains the geographical location where the 
customer may divert water from. There is normally a map also attached to the contract, 
indicating the location. It may alternatively be called the "point(s) of delivery" or 
"delivery point", or "delivery of water".
                                                
1
When surveyed for contracts, the TRA provided  two separate contracts, one for the City of 
Ennis and another for Lake Livingston area. The City of Ennis is considered to be a representative city in 
the dealings of the TRA.
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SRA allows the "construction of facilities on and across the authority's land, the 
customer provides the necessary documents in approving the usage of the authority's
land in a manner acceptable to the authority". The facilities used by the customers are
also subject to flood damage due to its location near a watercourse. The customer is 
supposed to recognize the possibility of flood damage and is asked to assume the risk in 
case such an event does occur. Also, the customer agrees that the use of the facilities 
shall not cause pollution of reservoirs and other adjoining water bodies. This clause is 
also found in BRA's contract.
The "metering of diverted water" is a clause present in the contracts of all 
authorities. The customers agree to bear the cost when they install, operate, and maintain 
meters for the accurate measuring of all water diverted by them in order to aid 
authorities in accurately reporting the actual water usage.
The "purpose of use" clause as seen in Table 3.2, is present in the contracts of 
LCRA, SRA, SARA, and the representative city entity of TRA. LCRA and SARA 
specify in their contracts that if the authority is selling water to a "municipal institution", 
the water ought to be used only for municipal purposes by the customer. This is also 
specified in the contract of SRA, along with the location served by the customer's 
municipal water system. The contracts of SRA and TRA also mention further sales made 
by the customer to being made on a retail basis, and the customer is prohibited to sell 
water on a wholesale basis.
"Area of use" is sometimes mentioned along with the "purpose of use". In the 
case of LCRA there are two separate entries for the purpose of use and the area of use. 
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TABLE 3.2. Contract Water Terms.
Terms BRA GBRA LCRA LNVA SRA SARA SJRA TRA UCRA
A B
Point(s) of Diversion       
Facilities for Diverting 
Water  
Metering of Diverted 
Water         
Purpose of Use    
Area of Use     
Availability of Water   
Operations of Dams and 
Reservoirs 
Interbasin Transfer  
Water 
Conservation/Drought 
Contingency Measures       
A : Lake Livingston reservoir; B : A Representative City
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The "area of use" for LCRA is restricted to a certain area containing a given number of 
acres and this area is described in maps. SRA, SARA and the representative city entity 
of TRA have a combination of the purpose and area of use entry. 
The "availability of water" section in BRA, LCRA and SRA contracts state that 
the authorities will make an amount of water that is not exceeding the contractual 
amount, available to the customer from the authority's water supply per fiscal year. The 
customer also does not acquire any property right other than its "diversion and use under 
the terms of contract" (LCRA).
LCRA is the only authority to have the "operation of dams and reservoirs" 
section in the contract as listed in Table 3.2. The right of LCRA to "maintain and operate 
its several dams on the Colorado River and at any time in the future to impound and 
release waters is required to be recognized by the customer in the contract". Also there is 
no obligation upon LCRA to "release or not release any of the stored waters at any time 
or to maintain any waters at any specified level".
The last term in Table 3.2, the "water conservation/drought contingency 
measures" clause is present in the contracts of all the authorities except for SJRA and 
UCRA. Here the customer agrees to implement the water conservation program and 
drought contingency measures in accordance with the water conservation plan of the 
river authority. Also the customer has to agree that if they provide water to a third party 
that will in turn sell the water to the final consumer, the requirements with reference to 
water conservation will be met through contractual agreements between the customer 
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and the third party providing for the "establishment and implementation of a water 
conservation program in compliance with law".
Environmental Terms
The "nonpoint source water pollution abatement" section is present only in the 
water supply contracts of BRA and LCRA, as seen in Table 3.3. In this case the 
customer agrees to execute a nonpoint source water pollution abatement program in 
agreement with the nonpoint source pollution abatement plan of the authority. The 
authority may from time to time adopt rules and regulations relating to the abatement of 
nonpoint source water pollution and the customer is "required to amend its plan as 
necessary to reflect such pollution abatement rules" (LCRA). There is also a stipulation 
in the contract of the BRA under the "quality of water" term, that the customer is 
"required to implement water quality protection measures which include a nonpoint 
source water pollution abatement program in accordance with a nonpoint source water 
pollution abatement plan".
The "quality of water" clause may be found in most of the authorities' contracts. 
This may be seen in Table 3.3 which also indicates that UCRA is the only river authority 
that does not have this clause in its contract. This clause may have a different meaning in 
each contract. With BRA, this section requires that the "customer comply with the water 
quality standards of Texas in the diversion, use, reuse, or discharge of water made 
available by the authority. With GBRA this clause is interpreted as "the type of water 
being supplied as being untreated water as it occurs in the Guadalupe River at the point 
of diversion". LCRA uses this section to decline liability. It "makes no representation as
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TABLE 3.3. Contract Environmental Terms.
Terms BRA GBRA LCRA LNVA SRA SARA SJRA TRA UCRA
A B
Nonpoint Source Water 
Pollution Abatement  
Quality of Water        
Sewage Regulations 
Wastewater Treatment  
Environmental Quality 
Development and Water 
Quality Regulations 
A : Lake Livingston reservoir; B : A Representative City
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to the quality of the water supplied under the contract and the customer is to release 
LCRA from any impairment in the quality of water supplied under the contract caused 
by any acts or omissions on the part of the LCRA". LNVA has a combination of both 
GBRA's and LCRA's quality of water sections. SRA's contract has a variation which 
explains the quality as being that of "raw water, i.e., non-potable, raw and untreated". 
The mentioned terms are as per SRA’s contract and could be considered differently by 
different authorities. SARA's contract states the quality of water as being the quality of 
drinking water, provided that the "customer does not hold the authority responsible for 
the quality, the treating and testing of the water". SJRA's contract puts forth a slightly 
different agreement. The "authority will take measures to maintain the quality and 
prevent pollution of the water. It also will make it known to the customer in case there 
are any unforeseen permanent changes in the water quality which might adversely affect 
the customers".
The representative city section of TRA has a different approach to the "quality of 
water" term. Here the customer is required to cooperate and assist the authority in 
developing and implementing plans to maintain and improve the quality of water. The 
quality of water stipulation in the Lake Livingston Project contract of TRA is different in 
that it refers to the quality as being "non-potable, raw and untreated water". The 
authority also "disclaims any warranty as to the quality or suitability for use by the 
customer. The customer is required to agree that any variation in the quality of the water 
will not entitle the customer to avoid its obligations to pay for the water".
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The "sewage regulations and wastewater treatment" sections may be found in 
LCRA and TRA contracts. The "customer agrees to obtain all approvals required by all 
applicable local, state, or federal agencies for any sanitary sewage systems which collect 
sewage derived from water diverted" (LCRA). 
The "environmental quality" segment is found only in the contract of UCRA. The 
contract stipulates that "during any construction, operation, and maintenance by the City 
of Miles [the authority's one and only customer], of any facility, specific actions will be 
taken to control environmental pollution which could result from such activity and to 
comply with all federal, state, and local laws concerning environmental pollution". 
LCRA is the only authority having any information on the "development of water 
quality regulations" within its contract. This may be seen listed in Table 3.3. Here the 
"customer agrees to provide LCRA with written verification that all the plans and 
designs of improvements to be constructed by the customer are in compliance with 
federal, local and state laws, before the actual diversion of water takes place".
General Provisions
All nine authorities have the "term of the contract" or the agreement present in 
the contract. This fact may be noted from Table 3.4. The beginning and end date of the 
contract may be found under this section. Some state the number of years for which the 
contract is in force. 
The "termination of contract" is also stated by all authorities with either a 
separate clause for the same or by stating the end date for the contract in the clause for 
the term of the contract. This is the case with BRA, LNVA and SARA. GBRA's contract 
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TABLE 3.4. Contract General Provisions.
Terms BRA GBRA LCRA LNVA SRA SARA SJRA TRA UCRA
A B
Term of Contract         
Termination of Contract    
Notice       
Assignment of Contract         
Compliance with Filing 
Requirements   
Previous Contract 
Indemnification   
Force Majeure       
Representations and 
Warranties 
Amendment 
Binding Effect 
Severability      
Equity 
Pledge of Revenue  
Waiver     
Delinquent Payments  
Annual Adjustment 
No Third-Party Beneficiary      
Return Flows  
Payment of Taxes 
A : Lake Livingston reservoir; B : A Representative City
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states that the customer may terminate the contract at any time for any reason by giving 
the authority written notice of termination. LCRA states in its contract that "the contract 
may be terminated if a customer who is current on all payments may terminate the 
contracts by giving an advance notification in writing past the expiration of 5 years". Or, 
LCRA may terminate the contract when it finds that the customer has failed to comply
with the terms and conditions of the contract by failing to make payments. Also the 
contract may be terminated if the customer fails to follow the conservation plan or the 
nonpoint source pollution abatement plan. If the customer fails to comply with the 
sewage regulations and development of water quality regulations, the contract may also 
be terminated. Any other requirements not plainly stated in the contract that were not 
met by the customer would also lead to termination. The contract may also be terminated 
immediately by LCRA upon the declaration of bankruptcy by the customer.
SRA's contract states that if the authority decides to terminate the contract, then 
the authority will provide an advance written notice to the customer. TRA's Lake 
Livingston contract mentions the contract being terminated upon the "mutual written 
consent of both the customer and the authority". The contract of the city section states 
that if TRA decides to terminate the contract then it should deliver written notice to the 
customer. 
LCRA refers to the "notice" clause in its contract as the notice under the contract 
being "transmitted by certified mail, with the return receipt requested and being effective 
on the date received". LNVA states the notice section as "any notice required or 
authorized to be given under the terms of the contract will be in writing and will be 
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delivered in person at the office address". With SRA, "all notices, payments and 
communications (collectively called notices) required by the contract are required to in 
writing and be given by hand-delivery or by depositing the notice in the U.S. mail, 
postage prepaid, registered or certified, with return receipt requested, and addressed to 
the party to be notified". This is also the same for BRA, SARA, SJRA, the representative 
city section, and the Lake Livingston Project of TRA. This may be noted in Table 3.4.
The "assignment of the contract" is a clause present in the contracts of all the 
river authorities. Grismore (1933) discusses this term as follows.
The early common law took a strictly logical view in regard to the 
assignability of contract rights and duties. Since a contract is essentially a 
personal relationship voluntarily entered into by the parties to it, it follows 
as a logical deduction that one of the parties should not be allowed to 
destroy that relationship by introducing a third person into it in his place 
without the consent of the other party. In order that some measure of 
choice in regard to the person at the other end of a relationship created by 
the contract may be retained it has become common practice for the 
parties to incorporate in the contract a clause prohibiting or at least 
restricting its assignment.
According to BRA, the contract may be assigned by the customer only with the 
written consent of the authority. Similarly, with the GBRA, the customer may not assign 
the contract without the prior written consent of GBRA. The customer of LCRA may 
"assign the contract only upon obtaining the approval of the authority in accordance with 
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the requirements for substantive amendments of contracts in LCRA's Water Sale 
Contract Administrative Rules". SRA's contract has something very similar to that of 
BRA, wherein the authority also provides consent for the customer to assign the contract 
to the USA for collateral. With SARA, "neither party may assign the contract without 
the prior written consent of the other party except to a successor of the duties of that 
party". SJRA's contract is similar to that of SARA, so also is that of TRA (both sections) 
and UCRA.
LCRA and the Lake Livingston Project of TRA are the only authorities that make 
mention of "filing plans" in their contracts. According to the contract of TRA, "before 
diverting water the customer should file and have approved by the authority, detailed 
plans and specifications for the diversion structure.  A narrative description of the 
location, size, and maximum diversion rate of the facility and a vicinity map showing the 
location of the diversion structure and place of use shall be attached as an exhibit to the 
contract.  A legal description of the point of diversion should be provided including the 
bearing and distance from a known survey point and the latitude and longitude in 
degrees, minutes, and seconds.  The cost of diversion facilities and costs associated with 
the operation and maintenance will be required to be borne by the customer". LCRA 
agrees to "file a copy of the contract with the Executive Director of the Texas Natural 
Resource Conservation Commission, the customer is required to understand that the 
effectiveness of the contract is dependent upon compliance with the substantive rules 
and procedural rules for water rights of the Texas Natural Resource Conservation 
Commission".
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The only authority to have a clause pertaining to "previous contract" within its 
contract agreement is LCRA. It stipulates that "upon the effective date of the contract 
that certain Water Sale Contract between LCRA and the customer shall be null, void, 
and of no further legal force and effect".
Indemnification is a clause present in LCRA's contract, as well as those of SRA, 
and TRA. This may be noted in Table 3.4. 
The customer is supposed to indemnify and save the authority from any 
and all claims to which the authority may be subjected by reason of any 
injury to any person or damage to any property resulting from any actions 
(or failure to act) of the customer under the contract except to the extent 
caused by the authority’s gross negligence or willful misconduct (LCRA).
The authority will also save the customer from any claims to which the authority may be 
subjected by reason of any injury to any person or damage to any property resulting from 
or in any way connected with any actions (or failure to act) of the authority under this 
contract.
One of the common terms that the authorities share, except for GBRA and 
UCRA, is that of force majeure. The term "Force Majeure", according to LCRA, means:
Those situations or conditions which are beyond the control of the 
authority or the customer and which, after the exercise of diligence to 
remedy such a situation, render the authority or the customer unable to 
carry out the contract.  Such force majeure includes but is not limited to 
acts of God, strikes, lockouts, acts of the public enemy, orders of any kind 
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of the government of the United States or of the State of Texas or any civil 
or military authority, insurrections, riots, epidemics, landslides, lightning, 
earthquakes, fires, hurricanes, storms, floods, washouts, droughts, civil 
disturbances, explosions, breakage or accidents to machinery, pipelines, 
canals, or dams, partial or entire failure of water supply insofar as each of 
the foregoing are beyond the reasonable control of the party in question.  
The authority will not be held liable or responsible for any damage that 
may be caused by its inability, after the exercise of diligence, to make the 
supply of water available to the customer due to any force majeure.  
Both LCRA and the customer "represent and warrant" to the other that "the 
contract will be duly executed by an authorized officer and constitutes a valid and 
binding contract, enforceable against according to its terms".
With LCRA alone do we find the "amendment" section. "The contract may not 
be modified or amended except by an instrument in writing signed by authorized 
representatives of the parties". The same is also true with the "binding effect" clause. 
The "terms of the contract is binding upon, and inure to the benefit of, the parties and 
their permitted successors and assigns" (LCRA). 
"Severability" is found in most contracts except for those of GBRA, LNVA, 
SJRA, and UCRA. This may be noted from Table 3.4. In the event that any provision of 
the contract is held invalid by any court, the parties should negotiate an "equitable 
adjustment" to the provisions of the contract.  
56
The provisions of the contract are severable and if for any reason any one 
or more of the provisions in the contract is held invalid, illegal or 
unenforceable in any respect, the invalidity, illegality or unenforceability 
will not affect any other provision of the contract and the contract will 
remain in effect and be considered invalid, illegal or unenforceable 
provision had never been contained in the contract (LCRA).
A clause referring to "equity" is found only in SRA. Here "the customer 
acknowledges that it will accrue no equity or any other interest in the contract or any 
other assets of the authority as a result of payment or other performance of the customer 
under the contract".
"Pledge of revenue" is present in the contract of the representative city section of 
TRA. Here the customer is required to acknowledge that all the payments that will be 
made by it are the necessary "operating expenses" and that all these payments will be 
made from the revenues of the "water system". The customer also "agrees throughout the 
term of the contract to operate and maintain its water system and to fix and collect rates 
and charges for water services to be supplied by its water system so that it will produce 
revenues in an amount equal to all of its payments under the contract". 
According to BRA, the "waiver" section states that "any waiver at any time by 
any party of its rights with respect to default under the contract shall not be deemed a 
waiver of such rights with respect to any subsequent default or matter". This is the same 
for LNVA, SRA, SARA, and the representative city section of TRA.
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The "delinquent payments" section is present only in the contract of the Lake 
Livingston Project of TRA. "All amounts due and owing to the authority by the 
customer, if not paid when due, bear interest at the rate of ten (10) percent per annum 
from the date when due until paid".  If any amount due and owing by the customer to the 
authority is placed with an attorney for collection, the customer pays the authority the 
attorneys' fees, in addition to all other payments, including interest.
"Default in payments" is a common term in most of the contracts. It is found in 
the contracts of BRA, LCRA, SRA, SARA, and TRA. All amounts due and owing to the 
authority by the customer according to the contract are billed and paid monthly.  "If not 
paid when due, such amounts bear interest at the maximum rate allowed by law, from 
the date when due until paid; provided that such rate shall never exceed the maximum 
rate as otherwise permitted by law" (BRA).  If any amount due by the customer is placed 
with an attorney for collection by the authority, then the customer shall pay the 
authority, including interest, the authority's collection expenses and any related court 
costs and attorney’s fees.
The "annual adjustment" section is present only in the contract of GBRA. "The 
customer agrees to pay GBRA, an amount equal to the raw water rate times the number 
of acre-feet by which the total amount of water diverted at the point of diversion in the 
previous calendar year exceeds the annual commitment, provided, however, that nothing 
in this section shall be construed as obligating GBRA to supply in any year more water 
than the annual commitment".
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With the "no third-party beneficiary" section, as seen in Table 3.4, the parties 
enter into the contract for their benefit and agree that "nothing shall be considered to 
confer any right, privilege or benefit on any person or entity other than the parties". This 
clause is present in the contracts of LCRA, LNVA, SRA, SARA, and the representative 
city section of TRA. 
The "return flows" segment can be found in the contracts of SRA, as seen in 
Table 3.4, and both sections of TRA. Here the customer acknowledges that some of the 
water supplied to it by the authority may be returned to the watercourses as return flows. 
The authority believes that the most economical means for meeting some of the future 
demands of the authority's customers may involve the use of return flows to extend or 
augment the yield of the authority's reservoirs. The customer agrees that the authority 
has the right to make whatever reuse of the water the authority deems desirable. "The 
customer receives no compensation, credit, or off-set for making return flows available 
to the authority according to the contract" (SRA).
Another segment that is unique to one of the authorities is the "payment of taxes" 
segment in the contract of the Lake Livingston project of TRA. That is, "in the event any 
sales or use taxes, or taxes of any similar nature are imposed on gathering, taking, sale, 
use, or consumption of the water received by the customer, the amount of such taxes are 
required to be borne by the customer". In addition to all other charges, and whenever the 
TRA is required to pay, collect, or remit any such taxes on water received by the 
customer, then the customer is required to reimburse TRA.
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Dispute and Regulation Terms
The clause for "dispute resolution" is found only in the contract of LCRA. This 
may be seen in Table 3.5. 
In the event any dispute, controversy or claim between or among the 
parties arises under this contract including, but not limited to, a Dispute or 
Controversy relating to the effectiveness, validity, interpretation, 
implementation, termination, cancellation or enforcement of this contract, 
the parties shall first attempt in good faith to settle and resolve such 
Dispute or Controversy by a) mutual agreement, b) arbitration, c) 
emergency relief, or d) survival.
SRA, and the representative city section of TRA have clauses that deal 
with disputes but not so much about their resolution.
The "failure to deliver" segment is unique to the contract of the Lake Livingston 
Project section of the TRA. Here, the customer understands that the authority has made 
commitments of water available to authority under Certificate of Adjudication No. 08-
4248, as amended, prior to the effective date of the contract.  "The customer agrees that 
in the event of water shortage, the authority shall incur no liability for the reduction or 
termination of sales of water".
The "actual damages" clause is found only in LCRA's contract. Here, neither 
party shall be liable or have any responsibility to the other for any "indirect, special, 
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TABLE 3.5. Contract Disputes and Regulations Terms.
Terms BRA GBRA LCRA LNVA SRA SARA SJRA TRA UCRA
A B
Dispute Resolution    
Default in Payments     
Failure to Deliver  
Actual Damages 
Regulatory Bodies     
Regulatory 
Requirements    
A : Lake Livingston reservoir; B : A Representative City
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consequential, punitive or delay-related or performance-related damages including, 
without limitation, lost earnings or profits. Such limitation on liability shall apply to any 
claim of action, whether it is based on whole or in part on contract, negligence, strict 
liability, tort, statute or any other theory of liability".
The clause for "regulatory bodies" is present only in the contracts of LNVA, 
TRA, and SJRA, as seen in Table 3.5. Here, the "contract is subject to all valid rules and 
regulations and laws applicable passed by the United States, the State of Texas and any 
municipal or other government body or agency or by an authorized representatives or 
agent of any of them, having lawful jurisdiction" (LNVA).
The "regulatory requirements" section of the water supply contracts are related to 
the regulatory bodies segment and is found in the contracts of GBRA, SRA, SARA and 
the city section of TRA. The "contract is subject to all applicable federal, state, and local 
laws and any applicable ordinances, rules, orders, and regulations of any local, state, or 
federal governmental authority having jurisdiction.  The contract is specifically subject 
to all applicable sections of the Texas Water Code and the rules of the Texas 
Commission on Environmental Quality, or any successor agency" (SRA). 
Construction Terms
City of Miles, as the only customer of UCRA, is required to reimburse UCRA 
during any month of the contract all those charges assessed the UCRA by the City of 
San Angelo for electrical pumping of water delivered to the City of Miles. The City of 
Miles is solely responsible for construction and maintaining its pipelines and connection 
at the point of water delivery from UCRA to its well field and pump station. Both of 
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TABLE 3.6. Contract Construction Terms.
Terms BRA GBRA LCRA LNVA SRA SARA SJRA TRA UCRA
A B
Reimbursement for Electrical 
Pumping 
Construction and 
Maintenance 
A : Lake Livingston reservoir; B : A Representative City
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these provisions may be seen in Table 3.6.
WATER SUPPLY RATE SCHEDULES
Acquiring the rates used by Texas river authorities in the wholesale supply of 
water was done in the same manner as that of the water supply contracts. All fifteen river 
authorities were surveyed for their water supply rates via e-mail early August 2004. A 
reminder was sent to those river authorities that did not respond with the information. 
This was repeated one more time before the authority was called and the information 
was requested of the person in charge of such information. Ten river authorities involved 
in wholesale water supply replied with their rates. These rates are categorized into 
municipal, industrial, and agricultural rates.  After collating the information and 
tabulating it, a draft of the table was e-mailed to the ten river authorities that are 
involved in wholesale water supply for verification in June 2005. Along with the 
different rates which are identified in Table 3.7, a separate column indicates whether a 
block rate structure is being applied. These normally include increasing, decreasing, or 
uniform rates. With a decreasing block rate, the buyers will find that the price of water 
paid within each block is constant but as the consumption of water increases to a higher 
block, the price falls. With the increasing block rate structure the opposite is true. With a 
uniform rate all increments of water provided are priced equivalently. A ''D'' in Table 3.7 
indicates a decreasing block rate structure is used by the river authority. None of the 
authorities reported an increasing block rate structure.
A reserve rate is a rate set for any water that is reserved for future use. This 
amount helps the river authority in paying development costs and the other water 
64
resources management costs for water that is stored or reserved for future use. The 
customer pays for a quantity of water in the present that is intended to be used in the 
future. None of the river authorities, other than LCRA, make any mention of possessing 
a reserve rate.
 BRA used to have a reserve rate that has been removed recently. However, these 
reserve rates may continue to exist within its 'legacy contracts'.  These contracts have 
been set up for as a long as forty years, with customers paying the same water rate as set 
at the time of contract being signed the first time. These contracts were set up years ago 
with no thought given to inflation. BRA may be charging its regular customers what it 
might be losing due to its legacy customers. Interruptible water is that water which is 
available to the customer only if there is enough left over after the firm water customers'
requirements are met. This is an insecure supply of water. If there were to be any 
shortage of water, then it would be interruptible water customers who would be the first 
to be cut off. As the water availability has a lower probability so also is its value. 
LNVA’s agricultural customers use interruptible water. LCRA’s customers also have the 
option to use interruptible water at a lower rate, or pay the uniform rate of $105 that it 
charges all its customers. 
Some authorities apply the same rates to all three classes. GBRA, LCRA and 
TRA have the same uniform rate for all three user types. Other authorities have the same 
water supply rate for municipal and industrial purposes and a different rate for 
agricultural users. The Toledo Bend Division of SRA has this rate structure. It may be 
noted that SRA agricultural users pay almost a fourth of what other customers pay.
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TABLE 3.7. Wholesale Water Rates for 2004 (per Acre-Foot).
River Authority Municipal Purposes Industrial Purposes
Agricultural 
Purposes a
Reserve 
Rate
Block 
Ratesb
1. Angelina Neches -------Not engaged in water supply operations-------
2. Brazos ------$45.75------
3. Guadalupe-Blanco $88 $88 $88
4. Lavaca Navidadc ------$93.87------
5. Lower Coloradod $105 $105 $105 $52.5
6. Lower Neches $51.35 $56.19 $15e
7. Nueces ------Not engaged in water supply operations------
8. Red River ------Not engaged in wholesale water supply operations------
9. Sabine
Gulf Coast Divisionf 0 - 250,000 gal $46.77 - $96.77
250K – 500K gal            $46.5
500K – 1000K gal          $43.2
0–250,000 gal  $54.8-$106.5
250K – 500K gal          $54.5 
500K – 1000K gal        $51.3
$9.25 D
Toledo Bend Divisiong 0 - 250,000 gal $40.32 - $80.64
                   ------250K – 500K gal            $40------
                           500K – 1000K gal          $36.7
$9 D
10. San Antonio $84 
11. San Jacinto 0 – 10,000,000 gal           $73.7 
10,000K – 20,000K gal   $65.5 
------20,000K – 50,000K gal   $61.4------
50,000K – 150,000K gal $57.3
150000K – 300000K gal $55.3 D
12. Sulphur ------Not engaged in water supply operations------
13. Trinity h $75 $75 $75
14. Upper Colorado i $140 
15. Upper Guadalupe ------Not engaged in water supply operations------
a  Some of the reported agricultural rates pertain solely to interruptible rates. Consult the footnotes for individual river authorities to see.
b Block rates are marked "I" for an increasing block rate structure or "D" for a decreasing block rate structure.
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TABLE 3.7 Continued.
c  Lavaca Navidad River Authority provides interruptible water supply to its customers at half the firm water rate at $46.94.
d  Customers pay $105.00 per acre-foot for firm water supply and $4.50 per acre-foot for interruptible water supply, subject to availability on 
a semi-annual basis. They also pay a reservation charge = amount of water used in calendar year minus quantity allowed per year contracted 
for, and that difference is billed at $52.50.  If the amount of water exceeds the quantity allowed per year then a fee of $200 per acre foot is 
assessed.
e Lower Neches Valley Authority(LNVA) provides interruptible water to only its agricultural customers at $15.00
f  The rest of the rate schedule is as follows:
Municipal Customers Industrial Customers
1000K – 2000K gal       $40 1000K – 2000K gal       $47.74
2000K – 4000K gal       $37.4 2000K – 4000K gal       $45.16
4000K – 7000K gal       $35.16 4000K – 7000K gal       $42.9
7000K – 11000K gal     $33.54 7000K – 11000K gal     $41.29
11000K – 16000K gal   $31.93 11000K – 16000K gal   $39.67
16000K – 22000K gal   $30.96 16000K – 22000K gal   $38.38
22000K or more gal      $30.64 22000K or more gal      $38.06
g The rest of the rate schedule is as follows:
Municipal & Industrial Customers
1000K – 2000K gal       $33.54
2000K – 4000K gal       $32.25
4000K – 7000K gal       $30.32
7000K – 11000K gal     $28.7
11000K – 16000K gal   $26.77
16000K – 22000K gal   $25.80
22000K or more gal      $25.48
h This rate applies to the Lake Livingston Project alone.
i Has only one customer: City of Miles.
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SARA does not supply water to industries or agricultural users. As noted previously, 
UCRA supplies water only to the City of Miles. The rate quoted in Table 3.7, is the only 
one for the authority. SJRA does not have any agricultural customers and has the same 
rate for both its industrial and municipal customers. LNRA has the same rate for both its 
municipal and industrial customers and does not have an agricultural clientele. 
The rate that is displayed for TRA raw water is $75/AF. However, this rate is 
applicable only to TRA's Lake Livingston Project. The authority also owns water rights 
in other reservoirs, but those are Corps of Engineers (COE) lakes. TRA serves as a local 
sponsor for these lakes and sells the water to other entities on a pass-through basis. That 
is, the amount that COE charges TRA for the local sponsor's share of the debt and the 
annual operations and maintenance costs are passed on to TRA's customers. These costs 
vary from year to year depending on COE expenses at each reservoir each year. Also 
TRA has been phasing in a new rate over the past several years. Following a rate study 
in 1999, it was determined that the Lake Livingston raw water rate should be $95/AF. 
They hope to have their targeted rate in place by the end of year 2006 (Robert Stevens, 
TRA).
From the information provided by the authorities, it was evident that SRA and 
SJRA both had decreasing block structures. This may be said for these river authorities 
because of the schedules of rates that were provided. Other river authorities did not 
provide schedules giving rates according to the quantities. Hence, it can not be said that 
they have block rate structures. 
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STATUTES AND POLICIES
There is one statute that river authorities are required to follow that affect the 
setting of rates.  The only direct reference to rates is made in Title 6, Chapter 222, 
Section 222.011 of the Texas Water Code. This chapter in the Texas Water Code is titled 
"Lower Colorado River Authority", meaning that this one reference to rates and charges 
is meant only for LCRA and not for the other authorities. This section has been 
reproduced in Appendix 2 of this thesis. This section clearly states that "the fees and 
charges must be reasonable and nondiscriminatory and sufficient to produce revenues 
adequate…". This indicates the importance of revenue sufficiency. There is nothing 
mentioned here about any other objectives such as economic efficiency, simplicity, 
equity and fairness, or resource conservation. If any other objective is implicitly 
supported to any extent, it is legality.
Title 2, Chapter 13 of the Texas Water Code, titled "Water Rates and Services" 
also refers to fair wholesale rates for wholesale water supply to water districts, but this is
not applicable to river authorities as this refers to the sale of water by municipalities.
Chapter 291, Subchapter B of the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality 
(TCEQ) Rules refers to "Rates, Ratemaking, and Rate/Tariff Changes", and river 
authorities are only subject to these rules when they take on retail water supply activities
(Mr. Bill Smith, TCEQ). Subchapter I of the same chapter refers to "Wholesale Water or 
Sewer Service", which deals with petitions to rate reviews, and "appeals by retail public 
utility concerning a decision by a provider of water or sewer service".
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WATER SUPPLY RATE-SETTING OBJECTIVES
A questionnaire was sent to all those authorities involved in the wholesale supply 
of water. This questionnaire requested the authorities to rank and assess six objectives 
according to their importance. The questionnaire has been reproduced in Appendix 3. 
There were several authorities that did not respond to the questionnaire the first time it 
was sent. An e-mail reminder was sent to those that had failed to respond with the 
completed questionnaire. A copy of the questionnaire was then mailed out again to those 
authorities that requested another copy.  
The authorities were requested to rank the six objectives: revenue sufficiency, 
economic efficiency, simplicity, equity and fairness, legality, and resource conservation, 
according to their importance relative to the other objectives. The most important 
objective was requested to be ranked 1 and the least was supposed to ranked 6. The 
authorities were also requested to assess the objectives according to their importance 
either as most important, somewhat important, a concern, rather unimportant, or 
irrelevant. Rankings and assessments of the rate-setting objectives were obtained to 
further examine the importance of economic efficiency in river authorities’ rate-setting 
strategies.  
The objectives were defined to the authorities in the following manner. 
 Revenue Sufficiency: The rate structure and the levels of the rates should 
adequately recover the total costs associated with providing the service.
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 Economic Efficiency: The rate structure should promote patterns and levels of 
water use that motivate only the most valued uses of the authority's limited water 
supplies.
 Simplicity: The rate structure should avoid unnecessary complexity and be 
readily understandable to water users and others who are expected to make decisions 
based on water prices.
 Equity and Fairness: The rate structure should treat equals equally. Water 
customers should perceive rates as fair.
 Legality: The rate structure should be consistent with rate setting standards and 
other applicable laws; i.e. the rates should be legally acceptable.
 Resource Conservation: The rate structure should promote conservation of scarce 
water resources.
Out of the ten river authorities that were originally contacted, one was unable to 
furnish the information due to legal difficulties. One other river authority felt that all the 
objectives were equally as well as most important and so ranked all of the six objectives 
as 1. The authority also assessed all the objectives as most important. There were only 
eight legitimate responses that could be used in this inspection. Rankings provided by 
river authorities are displayed in Table 3.8. Assessments are shown in Table 3.9.
SUMMARY
The fifteen river authorities of Texas were contacted for their rate structures, 
sample water supply contracts, and their ranking and assessment of six rate-setting 
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TABLE 3.8. Rankings of Rate-Setting Objectives.
River Authority
Objective A B C D E F G H
Revenue Sufficiency 1 3 1 1 1 1 2 2
Economic Efficiency 6 4 5 3 2 4 3 4
Simplicity 3 6 6 6 6 5 6 5
Equity & Fairness 5 2 4 5 5 3 5 3
Legality 2 1 3 2 4 2 1 1
Resource Conservation 4 5 2 4 3 6 4 6
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TABLE 3.9. Assessments of Rate-Setting Objectives from Most Important to Irrelevant.
River Authority
Objective A B C D E F G H
Revenue Suffieicncy 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Economic Efficiency 3 1 2 2 1 3 2 3
Simplicity 1 2 2 3 2 3 4 3
Equity & Fairness 2 1 1 3 2 2 3 1
Legality 1 1 1 3 1 2 1 1
Resource Conservation 1 1 1 1 1 3 2 2
1 = Most Important
2 = Somewhat Important
3 = A Concern
4 = Rather Unimportant
5 = Irrelevant
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objectives. Out of the fifteen river authorities, four did not deal with wholesale water 
supply, and one of them dealt with retail water supply and not wholesale which is 
pertinent to this thesis. The findings from the responses were further tabulated. The 
variations between the rates and contracts of the ten authorities were examined.
Given that each of the contracts has various terms, related features were grouped 
together and tabulated. The six groups were price and quantity terms, water terms, 
environmental terms, legal terms, dispute and regulation terms, and construction terms.
The rates information that was requested was also collated and tabulated. Three 
different purposes were obtained from the rates schedules of the river authorities: 
municipal, industrial, and agricultural. Besides these purposes, there were reserve rates 
as well as increasing, decreasing, and uniform rates discussed. Some charge the same 
uniform rate to all their customers, while some do not. Some charge a different rate to 
each of their customers. When requested to rank six rate-setting objectives in the order 
of their importance by the authority, one of the ten authorities involved in wholesale 
water supply was not able to respond as it was experiencing legal problems. One other 
authority ranked all the six rate setting objectives as equally important. The six 
objectives were revenue sufficiency, economic efficiency, simplicity, equity and
fairness, legality, and resource conservation. The authorities were required to rank these 
objectives from 1 through to 6. They were also requested to assess each objective most 
important, somewhat important, a concern, rather unimportant, or irrelevant. Their 
responses were tabulated to enable comparison. 
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
INTRODUCTION
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section analyzes the rate-
setting objectives described in the last chapter. The second section discusses the 
inferences that may be drawn from rate schedules provided by those river authorities that 
are involved in the wholesale distribution of water.  The third section discusses those 
water supply contract terms that have some economic significance.
WATER SUPPLY RATE-SETTING OBJECTIVES
Given the size of the sample, quantitative analysis of objective rankings and 
assessments is restricted to the calculation of the mean and the variance. Revenue 
sufficiency is ranked the highest by five out of eight authorities on an average. Two 
authorities rank it second in the list of objectives and one ranks it third. The variance is 
1.125 for revenue sufficiency. This shows that there isn’t that much of a spread between 
the rankings made by the river authorities. The variance from the mean is small. 
Economic efficiency has a varied importance with the river authorities. This may be seen 
by the different rankings that the authorities give it, ranging from second to sixth. One 
authority ranks it second, two authorities rank it third, three authorities rank it fourth, 
one authority ranks it fifth, and one sixth. The variance for economic efficiency is 7.507.
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This shows a larger spread, and this is seen in Table 3.8, where the river authorities have 
marked economic efficiency ranging from second to sixth.
Simplicity is ranked the lowest of the six objectives by five out of the eight 
authorities. Out of the remaining three authorities, two rank it fifth and one ranks it third. 
Equity and fairness is ranked fifth by four authorities, fourth by two, third by two, and 
second by one authority. It has the highest variance for the rankings assigned by river 
authorities.
Resource conservation, like economic efficiency has a varied ranking. It has been 
ranked from second to sixth. It is ranked second by one authority, third by one, fourth by 
three, fifth by one, and sixth by two. Legality is ranked highest by three authorities, 
second highest by three authorities, third by one, and fourth by another authority.
The objective that river authorities rank second when setting rates is legality.  
While revenue sufficiency is ranked as most important by some river authorities, there 
were several who also ranked legality as most important. There is a .5 difference in the 
means between the revenue sufficiency objective and the legality objective. There is a 
variance of 2 for the legality objective.
The objective that the river authorities rank on an average as third, as shown in 
Table 4.1, is economic efficiency. Even though this objective is ranked third, it was a by 
a very small difference between this objective at 3.875 and the equity and fairness 
objective which is exactly 4. The variance for equity and fairness is 21.125. The spread 
or the variance from the mean is rather high only one river authority actually ranked the 
objective fourth.
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TABLE 4.1. Ranking of Rate-Setting Objectives by River Authorities of Texas.
Rank
Objective 1 2 3 4 5 6 Mean Variance
Revenue Sufficiency IIIII II I 1.5 1.125
Economic Efficiency I II III I I 3.875 7.507
Simplicity I II IIIII 5.375 14.445
Equity & Fairness I II I IIII 4 21.125
Legality III III I I 2 2
Resource Conservation I I III I II 4.25 9.031
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The objective that the river authorities rank fourth on an average is equity and fairness. 
This objective could possibly be considered almost as important as the economic 
efficiency objective as it comes in fourth by only .125 on an average. 
The objective that the river authorities rank fifth on an average, as may be noted 
from Table 4.1 is resource conservation. The variance for this objective is 9.031. The 
spread from the mean was not so much hence the variance was not too high. The 
differences in the averages between the three objectives, of economic efficiency, equity 
and fairness and resource conservation are very little. The difference between the 
objective that authorities rank fourth, and the resource conservation objective was .25 on 
an average. 
The simplicity objective was obviously not considered very important while 
setting rates. The variance for this objective is 14.445. As there were only two 
authorities that ranked the objective fifth, the spread from the mean was rather high. 
Given the fact that the river authorities are nonprofit in nature, it is to be expected that 
revenue sufficiency would be the most important objective.
Assessments of the six objectives as ranked by river authorities are displayed in 
Table 4.2. The average is taken of each objective's assessment as most important to 
irrelevant, and the results are tabulated in Table 4.2. This assessment information 
discloses how river authorities feel about each objective according to its importance
whereas the prior ranking of objectives indicates relative importance. All authorities 
assess revenue sufficiency as most important, while economic efficiency is assessed 
most important only by two authorities out of the eight reporting. An equal number of 
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TABLE 4.2. Assessments of Rate-Setting Objectives by River Authorities.
Rate
Objective 1 2 3 4 5 Mean
Revenue Sufficiency IIIIIIII 1
Economic Efficiency II III III 2.125
Simplicity I III III I 2.5
Equity & Fairness III III II 1.875
Legality IIIIII I I 1.375
Resource Conservation IIIII II I 1.5
1: Most Important
2: Somewhat Important
3: A Concern
4: Rather Unimportant
5: Irrelevant
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authorities assess economic efficiency as somewhat important and a concern. Simplicity 
is assessed as most important by one authority. Again an equal number of authorities 
assess simplicity as somewhat important and a concern, and one authority assesses it as 
rather unimportant. Equity and fairness has three most important assessments by the 
authorities, three somewhat important assessments, and also is assessed a concern by 
two authorities. Six authorities assess legality as most important while one assesses it as 
a concern and the other as somewhat important. Resource conservation is assessed most 
important by five authorities, somewhat important by two authorities, and a concern by 
the remaining authority. Resource conservation is assessed as most important by five 
authorities out of eight, and when compared with the earlier rankings this seems 
inconsistent. Resource conservation is ranked fifth in order of relative importance in 
Table 4.1. However, when taking into account the assessments made by the authorities, 
resource conservation looks to be an objective that the authorities consider very 
important. 
WATER SUPPLY RATES SCHEDULES
It may be noted that those authorities that have different rates for each customer 
actually have a higher rate for their industrial customers, for example, LNVA and the 
Gulf Coast Division of SRA have a higher rate for their industrial customers. The 
common element between LNVA and the Gulf Coast Division of SRA is that industrial 
users pay the highest amount per acre foot of water and agricultural users pay the least. 
As shown in Table 3.7, LNVA and both the sections of SRA have a very low rate for 
their agricultural customers while GBRA, LCRA, and TRA have a much higher rate for 
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their agricultural customers. However, LNVA's lower rate involves interruptible water 
provided to its agricultural customers while its municipal and industrial customers 
receive firm water. This may not be the case with SRA. While there are block rate 
schedules for SRA's municipal and industrial customers, agricultural customers have one 
rate.
When the draft of Table 3.7 was sent to the river authorities for verification, 
UCRA requested that they be treated like ANRA or NRA as not engaging in wholesale
supply operations. As they do supply water, albeit to only one customer, they are still 
technically considered to be a wholesaler supplier of water in Texas. Therefore they
remain in Table 3.7 and the analysis. The highest rate set for industrial customers by 
those authorities involved with the wholesale distribution of water is by LCRA. The 
lowest rate set for the industrial customer is by BRA.  LCRA has the highest rate for 
agriculturists, while the Toledo Bend Division of SRA has the lowest rate for its 
agricultural customers.
There are differences in rates between authorities because of regional disparities 
lending itself to a scarcity or abundance in the supply of water. As the quantity available 
for supply increases or decreases, so also will the price of water, like any other 
commodity. It would not be efficient to charge the same uniform rate throughout the 
state of Texas, as the costs of each authority differ given their location. However, 
charging different rates to different customers by the same authority is not economically 
efficient. It must be kept in mind that ex ante prices could be the same even though ex 
post prices may differ with those river authorities that charge a uniform rate to all their 
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customers. The theory set forth in Chapter II clarifies this. One rate should be used rather 
than the three different rates used for the three different types of customers. However, 
there is the case of different rates that could be allowed when it comes to reserve rates 
and lower rates for interruptible water supply. If a city is paying a lower amount so it 
may lay some claim to water for its future use, this would not necessarily indicate
inefficiency. The same would be the case with interruptible water.  The value of 
interruptible water is lower than firm water as it is an undependable supply and the 
customer may be left with no water. As this is not the same water as firm water, 
interruptible water can be priced lower without harming economic efficiency. 
The inefficiency or lack of attention to economic efficiency that arises from 
using different rates to different customers for the same water does not come as a 
surprise as we can see how the authorities rank economic efficiency in Tables 4.1 and 
4.2. However, given that the authorities do not want be running at a loss, or 
reprimanded for not being legally compliant, the objectives of revenue sufficiency and 
legality might be constraints. It may be the case that given the two constraints, they are 
actually putting economic efficiency ahead of all other objectives. Another element that 
lends itself to economic inefficiency is the usage of the block rates. None of the 
authorities use increasing block rate structures, but two authorities use decreasing block 
rate structures. These decreasing block rate structures are inefficient because they might 
encourage excessive water usage rather than water conservation. In fact, they provide a 
price incentive to increase water usage, leading to waste.
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The rate that agriculture is charged by SRA and LNVA is much lower than the 
other authorities that have agricultural customers. LNVA’s rate is low because the water 
available for their agricultural customers is interruptible. However, both the divisions of 
SRA have a low rate, yet the rate is not meant for interruptible water. The water used for 
irrigation purposes is metered at $9.25 or $9 per acre foot.  Irrigation water for 
agricultural purposes, including supplemental irrigation, will be supplied on “water 
used” basis, subject to negotiation depending on quantities, frequency, location, etc. 
WATER SUPPLY CONTRACTS
Tabulations as shown from Table 3.1-3.6 were made to ease the comparison 
process, showing exactly where the authorities were similar and where they were 
dissimilar. There are various terms in these contracts. Some of the contracts are lengthy 
while some of them are short. They tend to have certain similarities. Some of the 
contracts may be explained using different terminology, but they boil down to the same 
meaning.
The price of the water and the contracted quantity of water were found to be a 
common element in each and every contract furnished by the authorities as shown in 
Table 3.1.
A potentially important clause that is missing from most authorities' contracts is 
that of "rate revision". The only authorities that do have this clause in their contracts are 
GBRA and SJRA as shown in Table 3.1 in Chapter III. As informed by the management 
of BRA, the authority is now facing a problem of what they term as their 'Legacy Rates.' 
These rates were set on the contracts and could not be changed for over thirty-five to 
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forty years. BRA is currently unable to increase rates of these particular customers as 
these users are entitled, according to their contracts to a contracted quantity of water at a 
price set some time ago. Nor do these rates account for inflation. Therefore the revenue 
that is required in the performance of the authority's statutory functions is generated at 
by passing the burden on to customers without legacy contracts. Economic efficiency is 
likely to be thwarted in this case.
The costs of metering of diverted water in all the contracts are borne by the 
customers. This is similar to those of water utilities or the retailer suppliers of water. 
SUMMARY
Rankings of the rate-setting objectives by the river authorities are analyzed.  
Revenue sufficiency is ranked the highest on an average. Legality is ranked second by 
the authorities. Economic efficiency is ranked third overall on an average. The 
authorities rank equity and fairness fourth and resource conservation fifth. Simplicity is 
ranked the lowest by the authorities, as it is ranked sixth by five authorities, incidentally 
the same number of authorities that rank revenue sufficiency the highest.
None of the authorities find the objectives irrelevant when the objectives are 
assessed from most important to irrelevant. All authorities assess revenue sufficiency to 
be most important. Economic efficiency is assessed as most important by two 
authorities, somewhat important by three authorities, and a concern by three authorities. 
Simplicity is assessed low, earning one 'rather unimportant' assessment, while earning 
one most important assessment, three somewhat important and a concern assessments.
Equity and fairness is assessed most important and somewhat important by three 
84
authorities each. The remaining two authorities assess equity and fairness as a concern. 
Legality is assessed most important by six authorities, somewhat important by one and a 
concern by one authority. Resource conservation is assessed by five authorities as most 
important, somewhat important by two authorities, and a concern by one authority. 
There are differences in metered water rates between authorities because of 
regional disparities lending itself to a scarcity or abundance in the supply of water. The 
fact that some river authorities charge different rates to different categories of customers 
for the same water is economically inefficient. However, there are other rates such as 
reserve rates and the rates set for interruptible water that may be different from the firm 
water rate. This would still remain efficient because the water that is being supplied is 
not the same. 
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CHAPTER V
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
RESTATEMENT OF PROBLEM
Potential for water shortages in high growth areas have water providers looking 
for means to augment water supply. Even political leaders and water resource managers 
understand the importance of water demand. Price has been noted as an important 
ingredient in any evaluation of future water demands, since it is a signal of cost 
administered by water suppliers. Price is an important factor that consumers will use in 
their decisions on the quantity of water they will consume. Economic efficiency is not 
given much consideration when setting water rates. According to pricing theory, 
maximum efficiency is obtained when price is equated to marginal cost (Kahn, 1970; 
Brown and Sibley, 1986). River authorities use the average-cost pricing model rather 
than the marginal-cost one. It follows that economic efficiency may not be achieved by 
river authorities in their rate setting. 
RESTATEMENT OF OBJECTIVES
The primary objective of this study is to determine the rates structure and rating 
policies of the wholesale suppliers of the State of Texas. More specifically the following 
were the objectives of this study:
1) To study water contracts in use by Texas river authorities by identifying 
important contract characteristics.
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2) To determine the various factors affecting key characteristics of the water 
contracts used by river authorities in Texas.
3) To gauge whether economic efficiency is being advanced by contemporary 
water contracts through proper signaling of the appropriate marginal values.
4) To assess and compare the rate-setting objectives of Texas river authorities.
FINDINGS
Wholesale Pricing Theory
With growing water scarcity and increasing competition across water-using 
sectors, the need for water savings and more efficient water use has increased in 
importance in water resources management. The economic theory of pricing suggests 
economic efficiency would be attained at the point where water is priced at the marginal 
cost. Enhancing economic efficiency is a broad concept seeking the highest economic 
value of water use through both physical and managerial measures. 
We see that water prices, appropriately set and applied at different points of the 
water supply cycle, perform many valuable functions, such as allocating existing 
supplies efficiently by confronting water users with the costs of providing water, helping
signal water suppliers when supply augmentation is needed, and shaping an 
economically rational approach to a healthy water environment.
While this theory works for a certain slice of the suppliers of water, it does not 
work for some others, like the wholesalers. There are certain distinctions between 
wholesale suppliers and retail distributors of water.  The differences between 
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wholesalers and retailers question the adequacy of the existing theory in its universal 
application. This calls for a different theory of pricing for wholesale suppliers of water
The retail theory uses three components to determine the price of water, that is, 
the pricing of new connections, the price of water distributed, and the pricing of existing 
connections overall. These three instruments are not applied by wholesale purveyors of 
water. Wholesalers rely almost exclusively on volumetric rates. Here there is only one 
instrument. The wholesale supplier of water also has a variety of contract terms available 
for customers. 
Depicting economic efficiency with wholesalers is different than with retailers 
due in part to the position and shape of the average cost curve. The price is said to be 
economically efficient when it promotes patterns and levels of water use that motivate 
only the most valued uses of the wholesaler's limited water supplies.
There are alternative assumptions that can be made in the development of a 
wholesale pricing theory:
1. Using marginal-cost pricing in both sectors with specific reference to the 
objective of economic efficiency.
2. Using average-cost pricing in both sectors with specific reference to the objective 
of revenue sufficiency.
As marginal-cost pricing is examined, a policy issue comes into focus. A 
problem of revenue sufficiency arises in the case of the wholesaler. With the usage of 
average-cost pricing a different policy issue arises. As long as average costs are 
declining, water is underused due to the inefficiency in water use.
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The policy issues that crop up while using either marginal-cost or average-cost
pricing may be solved using certain policy tools. The inefficiency that occurs with 
average-cost pricing may be solved by using a revising form of marginal-cost pricing.
Marginal-cost pricing leads to a revenue shortfall. This problem that arises with 
marginal-cost pricing may be solved with the use of a lump sum instrument. This lump 
sum device should be something that is separate from the volumetric price of water; 
something that will not detract from economic efficiency while providing the wholesaler 
with revenue sufficiency.
Water Supply Rate-Setting Objectives
This study reveals that on being requested to rank six objectives: revenue 
sufficiency, economic efficiency, simplicity, equity and fairness, legality, and resource 
conservation according to their relative importance, the river authorities show a strong 
preference for revenue sufficiency by almost unanimously ranking it the highest. The 
objective of undergoing this exercise is to ascertain the relative importance of economic 
efficiency to the river authorities in comparison with the other five objectives. This 
objective is ranked third out of the six objectives. Legality is ranked second higher when 
compared to economic efficiency. Equity and fairness, resource conservation, and 
simplicity are ranked fourth, fifth, and sixth respectively. It is found that revenue 
sufficiency and legality are considered more important to authorities when setting rates, 
than economic efficiency.
The choices that the authorities are given are to assess the six objectives are most 
important, somewhat important, a concern, rather important, and irrelevant. This study 
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reveals that assessments made by the authorities show that none of the authorities find 
the objectives irrelevant. All authorities assess revenue sufficiency to be most important. 
Economic efficiency is assessed on an average as fifth out of the six objectives.
Water Supply Rate Schedules
This study reveals that some authorities charge the same uniform rate to all their 
customers like BRA, GBRA, LCRA, LNRA, and TRA. Some charge a different rate to 
each of their customers like LNVA, SRA, and SJRA. SARA and UCRA do not have any 
industrial and agricultural customers. 
Besides the water rate, LCRA also has a reserve rate. Some authorities also have 
another rate for interruptible water. LCRA has this rate for all its customers, while 
LNVA has this rate for only its agricultural customers. LNRA provides all its customers 
with interruptible water at half the rate of firm water.
There are differences in metered water rates between authorities because of 
regional disparities lending themselves to a scarcity or abundance in the supply of water. 
The fact that some river authorities charge different rates to different categories of 
customers for the same water is economically inefficient. However, there are other rates 
such as reserve rates and the rates set for interruptible water that may be different from 
the firm water rate. This would still remain efficient because the water that is being 
supplied is not the same. 
Another element that lends itself to economic inefficiency is the usage of the 
block rates. None of the authorities use increasing block rate structures, but two 
authorities use decreasing block-rate structures. These block-rate structures are 
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inefficient because they might encourage excessive water usage rather than water 
conservation.. In fact, they provide a price incentive to increase water usage, leading to 
waste.
Water Supply Contracts
All river authorities involved with the supply of water commit most of their 
water supplies to various uses and customers through contracts. These wholesale 
suppliers of water have a contract with their customers that contain legal agreements that 
need to be dealt with before the river authority supplies the water to the customer. 
There are various terms in these contracts. Some of the contracts are lengthy 
while some of them are short. They have some similarities. There are some terms that 
may be explained using different terminology but they boil down to the same meaning.
There are some terms in contracts that are unique to a particular authority. The number 
of pages of each contract would not be an indication to the length of each contract rather 
the number of words would be a better indicator of the length.
A potentially important clause that is missing from most authorities' contracts is 
that of "rate revision". The only authorities that do have this clause in their contracts are 
GBRA and SJRA.
LIMITATIONS
The number of river authorities in Texas are not even close to what would be 
considered a good sample size for statistical analysis. Out of the fifteen, only ten could 
be considered as part of this study. It was not possible to perform much quantitative 
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analysis given the small sample size. Since each one of the river authorities is unlike the 
other, it was hard to compare them. 
FUTURE RESEARCH NEEDS
The efficiency-seeking theory that was developed for wholesale suppliers of 
water could be more mathematically oriented. Although this study had some significant 
findings in rate differences, contracts, and rate setting objectives of river authorities, 
there are areas in which future research could be very beneficial. Hopefully this study 
helps initiate more research in the wholesale as the retail area of water pricing has been 
worked on extensively.
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APPENDIX I
SEC. 11.039.  DISTRIBUTION OF WATER DURING SHORTAGE.
(a)  If a shortage of water in a water supply not covered by a water conservation 
plan prepared in compliance with Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission or 
Texas Water Development Board rules results from drought, accident, or other cause, the 
water to be distributed shall be divided among all customers pro rata, according to the 
amount each may be entitled to, so that preference is given to no one and everyone 
suffers alike.
(b)  If a shortage of water in a water supply covered by a water conservation 
plan prepared in compliance with Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission or 
Texas Water Development Board rules results from drought, accident, or other cause, the 
person, association of persons, or corporation owning or controlling the water shall 
divide the water to be distributed among all customers pro rata, according to:
(1)  the amount of water to which each customer may be entitled;  or
(2)  the amount of water to which each customer may be entitled, less 
the amount of water the customer would have saved if the customer had operated its 
water system in compliance with the water conservation plan.
(c)  Nothing in Subsection (a) or (b) precludes the person, association of 
persons, or corporation owning or controlling the water from supplying water to a person 
who has a prior vested right to the water under the laws of this state.
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Amended by Acts 1977, 65th Leg., p. 2207, ch. 870, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1977;  Acts 
2001, 77th Leg., ch. 1126, Sec. 1, eff. June 15, 2001.
97
APPENDIX II
§ 222.011.  RATES AND CHARGES.  
(a)  The board shall establish and collect rates and other charges for the sale or use of 
water, water connections, power, electric energy, or other services sold, furnished, or 
supplied by the authority.  The fees and charges must be reasonable and 
nondiscriminatory and sufficient to produce revenues adequate to:
(1)  pay all expenses necessary to the operation and maintenance of the 
properties and facilities of the authority;
(2)  pay the interest on and principal of all bonds issued under this chapter as 
the interest and principal become due and payable;
(3)  pay the principal and interest on any legal debt created by the authority;
(4)  pay all sinking fund and reserve fund payments agreed to be made with 
respect to bonds and payable out of those revenues, as the payments become due and 
payable;  and
(5)  fulfill the terms of any agreements made with the bondholders or with any 
person on their behalf.
(b)  Out of the revenues that may be received in excess of those required for the purposes 
specified in Subsection (a), the board may:
(1)  establish a reasonable depreciation and emergency fund;                
98
(2)  retire, by purchase and cancellation or redemption, bonds issued under this 
chapter;  or
(3)  apply the excess revenues to any corporate purpose.                    
(c)  The rates and charges of the authority may not be in excess of what is necessary to 
fulfill the obligations imposed on the authority by this chapter or other law.  Nothing in 
this chapter shall be construed as depriving this state of its power to regulate and control 
fees or charges to be collected for the use of water, water connections, power, electric 
energy, or other service;  provided, however, that this state pledges to and agrees with 
the purchasers and successive holders of the bonds and other written evidence of 
indebtedness issued under this chapter that this state will not limit or alter the power 
vested in the authority to establish and collect fees and charges that will produce 
revenues sufficient to pay the items specified in Subsection (a), or in any way impair the 
rights or remedies of creditors or bondholders, or of any person on their behalf, until the 
bonds and other written evidence of indebtedness, together with the interest on the bonds 
or indebtedness and the interest on unpaid installments of interest and all costs and 
expenses in connection with any action or proceedings by or on behalf of the 
bondholders and all other obligations of the authority in connection with the bonds are 
fully met and discharged.
Added by Acts 2003, 78th Leg., ch. 996, § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 2003.  
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APPENDIX III
RATE-SETTING OBJECTIVES BY RIVER AUTHORITIES
Please check the appropriate box on the right of the objective. Also, rank the objectives 
from 1 to 6, where 1 would be ranked the highest and 6 the lowest, in the box provided 
on the left of the objective. An explanation of each objective has been provided below 
for your perusal. 
Most Somewhat A Rather
Rank Important Important Concern Unimportant 
Irrelevant
Revenue Sufficiency  
Economic Efficiency
Simplicity
Equity & Fairness
Legality  
Resource Conservation  
Revenue Sufficiency: The rate structure and the levels of the rates should adequately 
recover the total costs associated with providing the service.
Economic Efficiency: The rate structure should promote patterns and levels of water 
use that motivate only the most valued uses of the authority's limited water supplies.
Simplicity: The rate structure should avoid unnecessary complexity and be readily 
understandable to water users and others who are expected to make decisions based on 
water prices.
Equity & Fairness: The rate structure should treat equals equally. Water customers 
should perceive rates as fair.
Legality: The rate structure should be consistent with rate setting standards and other 
applicable laws; i.e. the rates should be legally acceptable.
Resource Conservation: The rate structure should promote conservation of scarce 
water resources.
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